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HUNGARY

Changes in Standing Rules for National Assembly Presented; Vote in December

25000032a Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian
7 Oct 88 p 3

[Article: "On the Modernization of the Standing Rules of Parliament"]

[Text] There is growing interest on the part of our parliamentary deputies, but also outside the walls of the House, in the ongoing modernization of the National Assembly's standing rules, said Mihaly Korom in the opening remarks of his report. This has come neither by accident, nor as something unexpected. After all, the process of transforming our system of political institutions has a direct impact on the day-to-day activities of the National Assembly.

There has been an improvement in the public's view of the role and importance of the National Assembly in the constitutional administration of society, and of its genuine efforts to assert its constitutional powers.

These powers center primarily around issues that pertain to determining the framework and the conditions of the legislative process and government work, ensuring that our laws are adhered to, and overseeing the activities of the government, which is the supreme body of executive power.

It is imperative to ascertain that the National Assembly performs its functions democratically, in accordance with our national program of socialist construction and within the constitutional framework of socialist pluralism. Observance of these requirements is what our rules of operation, that is the standing rules of the National Assembly, have been designed to ensure.

In my report I will be talking not about the draft proposal—that has not been completed yet—but about the work, ideas, and suggestions generated by the committee appointed by this body regarding the modernization of its standing rules.

The constitution presently in effect is scheduled for a comprehensive review. We have agreed, however, that we could not wait until the submission of the draft proposal for the modernization of our basic statutes—which is not anticipated to be complete before 1990—but to put proposals before the respected house in the interim that will immediately improve the legal and organizational conditions of the substantive activities of this body and its deputies.

Some of the committee's far-reaching proposals, he explained, would have a direct impact on the status of the Presidential Council, as well as on the relationship between the government and the National Assembly. Included among these are proposals to have parliament

elect the prime minister separately, and to give him the right to submit proposals regarding the personnel make-up of the government to be formed. They also propose that the authority of the Presidential Council under the present rules to call a meeting of the National Assembly be transferred to the president of the parliament, except in case of a statutory meeting. Also under consideration is a proposal to give the president of the National Assembly the right to sign and announce newly passed laws. In addition, it is proposed that—in order to reflect the actual practice—instead of the minimum limit of two parliamentary sessions currently prescribed, at least four sessions be made mandatory by the constitution and the standing rules. (It would be possible, of course, to hold more sessions if necessary.)

Mihaly Korom then went on to call attention to some ideas that neither now, nor later, would have a direct bearing on the future of our basic statutes. All of them, however, would require changes or additions to certain provisions of the standing rules currently in effect.

Our committee is of the opinion, he went on to say, that we should keep and even reinforce those existing rules that have stood the test of time, and, as before, are likely to serve the work of the National Assembly well. The main themes of the proposed amendments and new proposals in the legislative arena and in the area of personnel decisions are as follows:

- Leaving it up to the discretion of the National Assembly to decide whether or not it should debate more important legislative proposals in two rounds; in other words, first to discuss the principles of the legislative proposal, then the text of the completed law;
- Letting the National Assembly decide whether it wants to break with the current regulations and discuss not only the long-term and extended national economic plans and similar more important concepts in two rounds, but also other programs affecting wide segments of the population;
- Making it possible in the future for proposed amendments—prepared in writing and supported by justifications—to be submitted not to a standing committee, but to the president of the National Assembly. The president will be responsible for enlisting the given committee's support for the proposal. The same should apply to proposals submitted by deputies during a regular debate;
- Reinstating an earlier rule whereby—irrespective of the Council of Ministers' position—amendments offered by the deputies would be voted on first. We believe that this is necessary not only because under the present rules members of the government have been allowed to speak out of turn in support of proposals introduced by the Council of Ministers, but also because we feel that this will enhance the sovereignty of our house of representatives;

- The use of ballot-counting machines for tallying votes, which incidentally could begin immediately after the completion of the ongoing reconstruction project;
- The mandatory use of secret ballots when voting on matters pertaining to the office holders of parliament and to any other personnel-related issues that fall within its jurisdiction;
- Concerning parliament's oversight functions over the government's work, retaining the practice that allows deputies to ask simple questions aimed merely at obtaining information; however, we want to clearly separate this institution from the right of interpellation. In connection with this latter, we propose to abandon the restrictive measures introduced 2 years ago, because they have only curtailed the deputies' ability to assert their legal functions. We are on the opinion that the deputies should themselves decide whether in matters of common concern they simply want to ask a question or to interpellate—in other words, to register an objection.

One of the important new elements designed to enhance the basic work of the National Assembly, in Mihaly Korom's opinion, was a proposal to allow deputies to go outside their county delegations and standing committees and form separate working groups for initiating draft proposals and for other purposes connected with their activities as deputies.

The assumption behind this is that these groups can enhance the parliament's work because they are more effective in bringing to the surface and helping to contrast the different interests that are actually present in our society.

According to the laws of self-organization, these groups may be short or long-lived, or ad hoc entities formed with the intent to submit joint proposals or initiate a specific action. In essence, this proposal would leave it up to the deputies to participate in such groups with the stipulation that these entities cannot become involved in lobbying activities.

On the subject of improving the working conditions of the deputies, Mihaly Korom stressed that both in their election districts and in their legislative functions, deputies today are required to expend more time and effort than before, hence it would be only proper to include a provision in the standing rules for regulating the reimbursement of costs incurred in connection with their parliamentary functions. Deputies would—at their request—be entitled to 40 days of excused absence from their jobs per year. They would continue to receive their average pay for that period, but the employer would be reimbursed for this by the National Assembly.

We do not, in other words, support the adoption of the full-time deputy concept; however, the above proposed solution would help to clarify the situation of those affected.

More meaningful participation in the legislative process naturally requires that the deputies have a better understanding of what they are there to do, and that they be better qualified to make decisions. There is a growing feeling among the deputies—and rightfully so—that when it comes, for example, to committee work, they are not in the same league with the government. We are not saying this out of distrust for the government, but because we have decisionmaking responsibilities. Hence, the standing rules should also make provisions for allowing deputies to use experts independent of the government, particularly in committee debates.

Subsequently, Mihaly Korom reminded his listeners that the committee appointed by the deputies was working on several other proposals as well. Among them were suggestions to require elected deputies, parliamentary office holders, and members and leaders of other organizations under their jurisdiction to be ceremoniously sworn in before the National Assembly; to bring the legal status of the nondeputy members of the Constitutional Council more closely in line with that of its deputy members; to set up two new standing committees, namely an information and a science policy committee; to set only a minimum limit on the size of standing committees; to declare all committees to be equal; to include provisions in the standing rules to ensure that the standard protocol of debate is observed; and to address certain questions pertaining to the release of parliament documents to the public.

In conclusion, Mihaly Korom asked the National Assembly to accept his interim verbal report on the committee's work; to support the main directions outlined in the proposals aimed at enhancing the work of the National Assembly and at more effectively regulating that work under the standing rules; and, finally, to be informed that the committee would submit its specific proposals regarding the standing rules at the December 1988 session of the National Assembly, after they have been discussed by the county deputy delegations, and after the conclusions from the resulting debates have been assessed.

Law To Clarify, Restrict Party's Power Discussed
25000040a Budapest OTLET in Hungarian
20 Oct 8 pp 10-11

[Article by Ervin Csizmadia: "Is There a Need for a Party Law?"]

[Text] According to Paragraph 3 of the Hungarian Constitution, "The Marxist-Leninist party of the working class is the leading force of society." It is the fundamental function of the renewal of the political system to designate more clearly and more accurately the role of the party in the life of society. By now, no one in Hungary who thinks in terms of social sciences or law has doubts about the fact that changes must be made

relative to the party's leading role. Opinions vary however, as to how the legal status of the MSZMP will be defined in the future political system.

According to one current viewpoint (represented rather pronouncedly by Peter Schmidt) there is no need today to "limit" the party, meaning that the party's renewal, the party's becoming more democratic cannot be accomplished by limiting its authority. A party's authority as a political movement (and not only the MSZMP's) is unlimited in a political sense. If there are limitations, those cannot be expressed in legal terms in the context of authority. Instead they are political limitations, tied to other interests and opinions, or to compromises between such other interests and opinions. Consequently, the goal should be to develop political conditions, to create a situation in which the existence and functioning of various interests groups defines (and thus also limits) the party's functioning. This viewpoint may be argued by saying that an organization or party in power will never establish limitations for itself. This is the most frequently used argument to counter [Schmidt's view]. A reasoning advanced by Istvan Schlett is similar to, nevertheless different from the above. This approach is reflected in Schlett's conception of a "constitutional single-party system" (OTLET, 5 May 1988). In the framework of Schlett's conception, the party would continue to preserve its independence and several lines of decisionmaking authority that it could exercise without the approval of society. Some examples for these authorities pertain to socialist orientation and to the assurance that Hungary belongs to [its present] system of alliances. In Schlett's conception, the head of state would be nominated by the party, and the head of state would have the right to veto efforts to modify the Constitution. Accordingly, civilian society would surrender certain rights, but, in exchange for surrendering those rights, it would receive the following three features: limited parliamentary pluralism, the possibility to organize autonomous organizations and corporations representing interests, and the direct exercise of democracy and self governance. All these contribute to the fact that the situation of the party would be accurately circumscribed on the one hand, and society's sphere of activities would significantly increase.

Another conception which differs from the above urges the creation of some kind of party law. It argues against the idea that the party, by its own volition could limit itself, and therefore deems necessary the separate regulation [of the party] by law. This view is represented primarily by Mihaly Bihari, and in yet unpublished recommendations for evolution. Those advocating such views acknowledge the fact that radical change is needed in the party's internal life and in its organizational procedures, but are able to perceive such change relative to a single party system only in the framework of legal limitations on the party's authority. According to this view the party law would have to circumscribe the authority of the Central Committee [CC]. In a manner similar to Schlett's conception, the determination of

obligations related to the external system of alliances would be within the CC's jurisdiction. In this regard the National Assembly would have advisory authority only. The CC would make recommendations concerning the persons to be appointed as president of the National Assembly, president of the presidium, the prime minister's and other ministerial posts (foreign affairs, defense). Matters not regulated by the party law may be pursued by the party through political means. For example: regarding such matters the party could not instruct the cabinet directly, instructions would have to be channeled through the National Assembly. Further, the relationship between the party and social organizations must also be settled. Recognition of the party's leading role must not violate organizational autonomy.

Consideration should be given to the avoidance of party interference in the appointment of organizational leaders, and that the party's recommendations as to personnel not be mandatory. And the party should not be able to veto leaders who were elected by way of autonomous processes. In summary, the purpose of the party law could be to assign legal responsibility to the MSZMP, and that the MSZMP could be held accountable for its actions. Those who argue against this conception believe that the legal regulation of the party's role would represent recognition of the party's peculiar position [in society], while in these days one of the most important goals is to discontinue the party's peculiar position which has evolved earlier and to cease the party's detachment from society.

One may argue over the question whether there is a need for a party law. From a certain point of view all viewpoints involved are transcended by time. We are discussing more and more the issue of pluralism, or at least the organization of various interest groups, after all. Accordingly, it would be worth pondering what constitutional solutions are available to protect and to legalize the newly emerging organizations. The question is this: will it suffice to think in terms of a party law only.

Party Law in West Germany

On an international scale party laws are rather rare phenomena. From among the European countries only the Federal Republic of Germany took advantage of having separate legal regulations pertaining to parties. Article 21 of the basic law (Constitution) of 1949 of the Federal Republic contains three sections related to parties. One circumscribes the kinds of parties that may function in the country. The second defines causes for exclusion. The third section provides that federal laws enforceable throughout the country must govern the functioning of parties.

The party law that came about in 1967 was preceded by extensive debate. The alternative adopted in the end contains two substantive provisions. First, it regulates the internal functioning of the party, and the method by which party officials are to be elected. It also limits the

number of ex officio party leaders. Second: it accurately describes the financial accountability of parties. In this context parties are obligated to make public their financial reports. Such reports must be submitted to the head of state, who, in turn, presents those to public opinion. Such financial reports must state the names of supporters contributing more than 20,000 marks to individual parties.

It is apparent that West Germany's party law came into being in order to forestall a repetition of history. Even though there is no separate party law in Spain, special rules govern the parties in that country, too.

Party Leadership Divided: 2 Taboos Left
25000043b Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian
21 Oct 88 p 41

[Article by Ferenc Varnai, Deputy Editor in Chief of MAGYARORSZAG: "The Center: Two-Front Party Policy"]

[Text] An increasing division in public opinion could be felt already prior to the party conference. Aside from the brief transitional period that followed the conference, the phenomenon continues to exist. Stated more accurately: division is not characteristic of Hungarian public opinion as a whole, it is more characteristic of people who engage themselves in political discourse. This is so because an overwhelming majority of the people is united in the quest for peace and order, and a more hope-filled tomorrow, after all.

Historic Antecedents

The MSZMP has a growing responsibility to properly channel emotions which are becoming more extreme. This responsibility, however, cannot be assumed in response to a command, or perhaps to renewed calls for a new consensus. It can be assumed only on the basis of a program which is capable of convincing and mobilizing an overwhelming majority to establish conditions required for an uplift through enduring work.

The 1946 consensus was built on the same foundations in the interest of defeating inflation, and subsequently for purposes of accepting the difficult tasks of a three year plan for reconstruction. In both instances the result hinged on the fact that the creators of the program battled on two fronts: against the nonbelievers on the one hand, and the overbidders on the other. Subsequently, however, as they departed from the two-front policy in the heat of "we're capable of accomplishing anything," the leaders' brains were impaired and some mistakes accompanied by tragic consequences ensued.

The successes of MSZMP policies established toward the end of 1956—and we may bravely say: These took the world by a positive surprise and served as examples in the practices of socialist countries—were also tied to

two-front politics. It was this kind of politics which enabled the rapid liquidation of damages caused by the counter revolution, the relaxation of society, the voluntary socialist reorganization of agriculture and later the achievement of its world-renowned results, as well as the development and beginning of reforming the economic policy making system. And as soon as it became necessary to confront new agenda items emerging from these changes—such as reforming the political institutional system and accepting the burdens which accompany the reshaping of the economic structure—the two-front political struggle was once again degraded into a slogan. They preferred to sweep the problems under the rug, and once again the stock of yes-men rose.

In today's situation the party leadership which directs the country, as well as the entire party membership and all sincere and sober believers in socialism are burdened with a particular responsibility not to permit extremist trends to gain ground in any direction. No ground should be gained either by those who underestimate the mistakes that were made, or by manipulations which instigate anarchy.

Barely five months ago the MSZMP conference cast its vote in favor of reforming the political institutional system. The newly elected Central Committee [CC] received a mandate to open doors toward pluralism: "Socialist pluralism based on the leadership role of the party is the condition for, and means of the enforcement and practice of popular power. Socialist pluralism provides an opportunity for the institutional expression and reconciliation of various interests, and for the molding of those interests into political will ... laws must govern self-initiated organizations, and the right to assemble and to associate, as well as the freedom of conscience and religion, the rights of nationalities as well as the guarantees that protect individual and community rights."

In the wake of this [statement] there emerged various democratic, independent left-wing and other groups using the "Communist" adjective, as for example the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the New March Front, the Association of Young Democrats, the Network of Free Initiatives, the Left-Wing Alternative, the Hungarian Party of Communists, etc. All this under conditions in which not only the governing legal provisions were absent, but also the final programs of these groupings were missing.

After the Party Conference

This change occurred so rapidly in our political public life that not even the MSZMP membership could find its way amid the events that took place. Part of the membership manifests uncertainty. Lack of understanding and passivity increased among the ranks. Others became impatient in response to a real or perceived concern for the interests of socialism. The fact that the party leadership did not provide appropriate direction to its 800,000

members served as a contributing factor to all this. It is equally true of course, that the party leadership was not, and continues not to be in an easy situation. In an effort to punish earlier inaction, the party conference elected an essentially new CC and Politburo. In other words: it created new personal conditions, and forced a change in the paralyzed political style. But even though it provided some important directions for the resolution of problems facing the country, this conference did not—it could not—provide well-considered answers in every respect.

All this contributed to the fact that although the need for democratic changes and the critique of the ossified leadership dominated during the conference, two trends emerged just at the time when changes were about to be made. One was that of the conservatives who instantly felt to have envisioned a new, quiet, creeping counter revolution in the democratic renewal of the political institutional system—one that is free of illusions and dogmatism, and one that is established to serve socialist goals. The other trend was based on persons according to whom nothing had happened, renewal did not begin, or on those who began to speculate about the disintegration of socialist order and relative to the liquidation of the protective organs of socialism.

At its late September session the MSZMP CC emphasized the need for the political struggle to be waged on two fronts. It renounced views which deny the need for socialist reforms. It maintained the ideas of socialist pluralism, of receiving constructive criticism with confidence, of preparing to conduct a patient exchange of views and of cooperating with anyone prepared to take part in the struggle against the mounting difficulties that confront the country and in promoting evolution. But the MSZMP CC also took a stand against ultra-radical forces which emerged in some of the alternative movements—forces which question [the validity of] the socialist system and endeavor to frustrate dialogue. In other words: the MSZMP is disassociating itself from the increasingly evident mistakes that were made in the 1980's, and from persons to whom mistaken decisions are attributed, and who desparately adhere to obsolete, outdated methods. Similarly, the MSZMP disassociates itself from those who view the past 40 years as the decades of mistakes and errors, and question everything that took place during the decades of popular power and of socialist construction.

As of today, the formulation of an absolutely clear viewpoint regarding these newly established, positive and negative groups is not possible, because these organizations and movements are themselves in a state of evolution, program development and internal self-purification. One must wait to see the kind of profile these organizations will assume, the contents of their final programs, whether they acquire a right for legitimate functioning on the basis of provisions pursuant to law, and most important, the type of practice they will actually pursue: whether their actions will conform with their written programs.

It is apparent that the MSZMP's relationship with these organizations will be different: the element of competition will be present even in regards to organizations which stand on the basis of socialism, moreover, even in relation to those which recognize the leadership role of the party. The MSZMP will wage its political battle with others while observing applicable laws. Legality must be the sole criterion from the standpoint of the state. The PPF, on the other hand, may expand, renew itself or form a "coalition" as a result of its relationship with these organizations.

Two Basic Issues

Insofar as the MSZMP is concerned, two basic issues determine its relationship with other organizations: the first question is whether those organizations support the idea and the renewal of the socialist system of society, and second, whether they accept the international system of alliances of Hungary.

The shaping of this relationship (cooperation and/or debate) will not be easy. It will not be easy if for no other reason because not only the newly forming organizations, but also a majority of the MSZMP membership lacks appropriate experience and political culture to engage in political dialogue. (The leadership core of the MSZMP is better prepared. Many of them have experienced political struggles. But the membership has been exposed to such experiences to a lesser extent: almost 80 percent of the membership joined the party after 1970.)

It is not easy to introduce changes without major shocks. After all, changes of this proportion have not taken place in Hungarian society since 1956. Nevertheless the key for the MSZMP, and foremost of all for its leaders: the members of the CC and of the Politburo to negotiate more smoothly the inevitably difficult curve is to formulate a unified, organizational position in the course of carefully debating the fundamental issues, a position which is represented in a disciplined manner by both the majority and the minority, and one which does not exclude the possibility of the addition of individual features in the process of enforcing that position.

True, the consequences of the processes of a decade and a half, the frightening dimensions of the economic balance, living far beyond one's means instead of accepting sacrifices which accompany modernization cannot be erased in a the course of a year or two. But demagoguery will not suffice in defeating the country's mounting economic problems which have an economic impact on every person. We cannot expect socialist renewal from "reformers" who once judged [Laszlo] Rajk, nor can we expect socialist renewal from people who seek revenge for 1956. And further, we cannot expect renewal from people who barely six months ago demanded that the establishment of new groupings be prohibited, nevertheless today are ashamed to wear the Communist label. Reforms resulting in an uplift can be accomplished in this country only by accepting responsibility.

In Defense of the Future

The MSZMP conference obligated the leadership to act as the central force behind reform policies against backwardness, to lead to battle everyone who supports the difficult process of modernizing the economy, and to see to it that in the renewing atmosphere of democracy the words of all well-intended persons be considered, including critical reviews of the past. The MSZMP nevertheless did not obligate itself to deny the values of the past four decades, or to reassess 1956. In its activities the MSZMP builds on the fact that a sober society will not espouse the views of others who accept a program which incites dissatisfaction only, rather than making constructive efforts to resolve actual concerns.

Tensions, Unrest Apparent at Universities
25000032b Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
13 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Agnes Peredi: "A Pot in Which the Water Is Boiling"]

[Text] We are living in a medium of uncertainties and tensions. Valves are opening up, emotions are surging to the surface, untold facts and unsaid thoughts are being expressed, and pretty soon we will be having a demonstration every week. Even for an adult, it is hard to make sense of all this. So how is one supposed to know what is going on as a "nearly adult." Is it possible at all to make heads or tails of the situation? What is it like today to be and to think like a university student? What is going on in the minds of university students these days?

Three of them are sitting around the table: Peter and Bela, both students of economics, and Andras, a liberal arts student. Just like that, without last names. At first they would have been willing to use their last names, but as we got to the end of our conversation they changed their minds. Because of the uneasiness, they said. True, one should be prepared to defend his views, but not in front of the whole world. For this is still not that kind of a world....

What kind is it then? It is one filled with uneasiness. At the university, as well as on the outside. After all, the university is a mirror image of the outside world. But let us, for the moment, talk about life at a university.

"The university is like a pot in which the water is boiling," suggested Peter. "Everybody is saying his own thing, and the whole place is echoing with the sound of reform. All kinds of new courses are being introduced. Yet I still do not have a clear picture of who really wants what. There is enormous confusion."

"We are forced to spend our time doing a lot of useless things. The educational system is not reacting quickly enough to the changes," said Bela. "Sure, in the past it did not even want to follow the changes, but then it still

cannot. I would take it even further and suggest that the aim of education should be not just to try to keep up with, but to actually be ahead of life. For now all I see is a lot of people wanting a lot of things, without being able to find a common denominator."

We Have Economics Coming Out of Our Ears

"In my opinion I should be focusing all of my strength and energy on studying in order to absorb all the knowledge and culture which our predecessors had accumulated," said Andras with an irritated tone of voice. "But instead I have to resort to tricks and machinations if, let us say, I want to enroll in a better seminar. Half of the curriculum is comprised of impossible tasks: for example, while we are expected to learn about 1500 years of world literature in just one semester, we are spending several times that amount of time on completely useless things. We are studying the same body of literature that had been screened for consumption 40 years ago. And we are doing this with a sense of complete futility, knowing that in Hungary today humanities are considered to be a discipline of secondary importance."

"What better symbolizes this state of affairs," interjects Bela, "than the fact that while the school of economics has just been renovated, at the liberal arts building we have loose wires sticking out of the walls."

"Today in this country we have economic jargon coming out of our ears; everything revolves around that subject," adds Peter. "Not because we have such tremendous accomplishments to boast about, but because this is what is considered necessary today. Our country has not only dropped behind the leading pack of nations—for remember that although we were never among the leaders, at least we always had the leading group in sight—but has actually fallen way back. We are in a situation where economics cannot be ignored. But I am personally very disturbed by the way we use this word, reform. In my opinion one cannot get very far by making little adjustments here, and major repairs there, or simply by putting a new coat of paint on the system we already have."

"As I see it, the intent of our reforms has been to serve as a defensive mechanism for our policy makers," interjects Bela. "It is yet another steam valve that allows everyone to talk about where mistakes have been made, but not about what mistakes we are making right now."

Phantom Organization

"At our university they have formed a FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth]. Perhaps only tacitly, but it has been approved," says Andras. "I went to one of their meetings. And what I saw was that they did not have the foggiest idea about how such an organization should operate at a university. The only thing they discussed was what they would discuss at their next meeting. So this is another phantom organization which had been successful in mustering popular support only while its objective had been to gather strength to resist. Once it

was legalized, it petered out. But these are not the kinds of things that I should be concerned about. I should be studying. Studying and studying."

"I agree," concurs Bela. "But from whom, and what? For it is true that we have a few fanatically dedicated, good teachers who no matter how little they earn are willing to teach. These kinds of teachers, fortunately, we have always had. But what can we expect from the majority who are paid 80 forints for a 90-minute lecture?"

"While we are on the subject of studying, it should also be noted that the caliber of the student body has also deteriorated. If you are enrolled in the university of economics you virtually cannot flunk out. A good indicator of declining quality is the situation at the language institute. One could learn a language very well here. The laboratory has the tape players, the video equipment and the tapes, all full of good materials. Yet, the lab is virtually never used. The only time it is, is when it is filled with students of gmk [economic work partnership] contractors who work for good money. Right now some of the students can hardly wait for the lesson to be over and leave. But I could also tell you something that I have heard from my father; he said that when he had been going to college, he had been taught by as many as 15 to 20 academicians. And look at today...."

"In my opinion, our universities are not suited to provide us with the knowledge we need," asserted Andras.

"But even if they were, the surrounding world is not ready to take advantage of that knowledge," adds Bela, "hence I think that it is unlikely that I will be able to use even the things that I do learn."

"There are actual examples to support this," confirmed Peter. "Just to mention one: for years, we have been hearing about how inadequate our old banking system is, and how we need to introduce a 2-tier banking system. So finally they introduced one. Still many outstanding experts have visited us, telling us about the quixotic struggles they have been forced to engage in with the old guard who insist on preserving the old system under the guise of the new. But these are not the only phenomena to cast doubt on society's readiness to use everything that we are learning. Hence we are all filled with uncertainties about what we are going to do after we receive our degrees. I, for one, still do not know. If I were to ponder too much over it I would get either very angry or very depressed."

"At the same time it is also true that if our society wants to continue to develop the responsibility of changing it should rest with its young people," Bela muses. "The problem is that I do not feel suited to do so. The reason, I believe, is that to this day I have been taught not to think for myself. And I am not the only one who feels this way."

Bela is indeed not the only one to have expressed this and other similar sentiments. The life of the university student, although it may appear to be carefree to the

outsider, is not problem-free anywhere. But there are some characteristic difficulties which young people are feeling here and now.

At the Institute of Psychology of the Liberal Arts Faculty of the Lorand Eotvos University of Arts and Sciences, a student counseling center has been operating since February of last year which deals with learning-related, family and adjustment problems of young people who contact them voluntarily. We have talked with Mrs. Pal Ritoo, PhD., a psychologist and head of the counseling center, about some of today's typical problems. Problems, most of which stem from the conditions of our society, and which, therefore, cannot be remedied by psychological assistance alone.

Without Demagoguery

"It is a world phenomenon for young people at this age to be more pessimistic and to feel hopeless, because they still cannot quite identify with adult life, while at the same time their bonds with their parents are no longer strong enough. When there is growing pessimism in a society this feeling becomes even more amplified among the younger generation. What makes the situation even more serious in our country is that the conditions of starting an independent adult life are poor and virtually hopeless, hence young people become even more dependent on the older generation which in turn further aggravates the tensions. The conditions for starting a career today are far worse than they were 10, or even 5 years ago. Characteristic of today's Hungarian conditions is the fact that young people become confused by various easy, but questionable methods of making money, as well as by many other social contradictions.

When we talk with our students we cannot ignore these phenomena. We need to talk about them openly, and we must work within the framework of these conditions to explore the possibilities of survival. Our lives do not differ significantly from theirs, so we are actually talking about common problems. And we will try to arrive at sincere conclusions, without demagoguery. With everyone who comes to us for help we must struggle our way through a different set of problems. It used to be easier to be a psychologist."

POLAND

Solidarity Restoration in Socialist Context Proposed

26000151 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
20 Sep 88 p 2

[Interview with Prof Janusz Kuczynski, philosopher, University of Warsaw, by Jadwiga Wiecek: "Pluralism as Condition for the Development of Socialist Forces"; date and place not given]

[Text] The word "opposition" has become part and parcel of Polish public life. The question of what the

opposition should be and what the limits to it are is a major issue. Is this opposition to somebody or to something? The PAP [Polish Press Agency] discusses this topic with Prof Janusz Kuczynski, a philosopher at the University of Warsaw, the author of many works published in Poland and abroad, including "The Appeal of Faith," "Christianity and the Meaning of Life," "The Order of the World to Come (Catholicism—Laicism—Humanism)," and "Homo Creator." He is a nonparty member and member of the Consultative Council of the Chairman of the Council of State.

Prof Kuczynski: Let us establish that we discuss what the opposition should be while avoiding the imperative mood. At present, the issue of the opposition in Poland is a consequence and the political materialization of the theoretical and historical recognition of pluralism.

In the dictionaries, "opposition" primarily means counteracting, setting your own policy or views against some other policy and arguments. Within a political structure of society, "opposition" means a group or party critically distancing itself from the government. Therefore, it is clear that the opposition is a fact—an increasingly important one at that—and, in essence, officially recognized for a long time now. I remember that at one of the first meetings of the Consultative Council its chairman sort of politically sanctioned opposition within the framework of the political system and structure of the People's Republic of Poland. However, the proper interpretation and place of the opposition in the state, in society, is an issue.

The opposition is an altogether constitutional and legally sanctioned ingredient of the sociopolitical reality in stable multiparty systems, which in some cases date back many centuries. On the other hand, our constitution mandates the leading role of the PZPR, or, precisely, the continuous leading role, because it is sanctioned constitutionally. Some question it, as if placing themselves beyond the legal order; others suggest that the constitution be modified rather than overthrown.

Despite numerous modifications being a natural consequence of society developing and maturing, I still believe that a place for the opposition may be found within the framework of the present [constitutional] provision, for which significant historical and theoretical justification exists. Its shortest and the most politically appropriate definition may be as follows: room for the opposition within the framework of the generally endorsed socioeconomic system of socialism. Such an opposition may and should be called the socialist opposition.

Wiecek: However, won't such an opposition pose a threat to socialism itself?

Prof Kuczynski: No. Moreover, it may play a great and creative role! Provided, however, that its place inside this system is precisely defined. Thus, in particular, the opposition cannot strive to smash "the system," but to

radically develop and improve it. According to the meaning of the word "opposition," it should oppose the government and all executive authorities, e.g. at the level of people's councils, provide a critical review of their operations, and, in extreme cases, demand the resignation of specific persons or entire inefficient collectives. This should be the normal practice of developing socialism, and especially, an increasingly "megapolitically" stable kind of socialism. Such review and criticism conducted from an expressly socialist standpoint should assume a humanized, nonantagonistic and nonaggressive form, as long as they have to deal with the ethically proper intent of the persons and groups criticized. I will add that such review and criticism may become a source of tremendous social vigor and a radical improvement in the processes of management and social self-steering.

Everyone knows functionaries in the offices of people's councils who should be immediately removed from their positions. I know several such ministers and well-known functionaries outside the government. I have a moral right to say this, because I have told them this to their face at meetings several times, and I have published my criticism. The development of political culture should bring about these personnel changes becoming something normal, without ruining people, and even with giving them credit for their comprehensively evaluated work, for its good and bad results. This is becoming increasingly possible, and maybe even natural or altogether evident. Socialism is going through a period of truly great transformations, which may become permanent, extremely useful and, I would even say, the salvation of Poland. However, several basic and, after all, easy-to-meet conditions should be preserved.

Unfortunately, even respectable people, intellectuals and scientists assembled by "Solidarity" at the presbytery of St. Brygida in Gdansk on 11 September, sometimes make astounding mistakes, e.g. in the declaration adopted there at that time on the necessity of recognizing "pluralism without adjectives." This declaration is tactically unfortunate, and historically and essentially erroneous. It amounts to a declarative renunciation of what can be termed quite precisely the socialist context of the discussion and reality. After all, it should be clear that pluralism in Poland can develop at all only and exclusively in this socialist context. As socialist pluralism—a term introduced by W. Jaruzelski during the reception of John Paul II at the Royal Palace in 1987—it has the best opportunity to genuinely enrich our country, certainly also to the satisfaction of those who, to be sure, do not want to be socialists, but always praise authentic values.

In the parlance of immediate politics, even genuine basic pluralism is an issue at present. Let us omit examples, let us look at the present time, cast a glance at the future and try to shape it together. At present, a marked strengthening of socialist forces is one of the essential prerequisites for such genuine pluralism. The less threatened they feel, the more willingly they will proceed to cooperate

continuously and loyally with the opposition forces within the system. We should not complete this line of reasoning, because the matter is abundantly clear.

Wiecek: Several years ago, the policy of so-called clipping of the wings was fashionable and, at that time, certainly justified.

Prof Kuczynski: On the other hand, it is increasingly evident now that the time is coming for the policy of extending and spreading the wings. Indeed, we should have powerful and far-reaching wings in order to overcome enormous difficulties, and, especially, to soar above current restrictions or even precipices. We should also mobilize all forces in order to get the wings moving.

In summation, I would stipulate that "Solidarity" be reinstated in the socialist context. In this context as well, a genuine reinforcement of all echelons in the executive apparatuses is one of the most urgent tasks.

Meanwhile, wholesale condemnation of the entire bureaucracy, without making distinctions needed for moral reasons if nothing else, has become commonplace. This debases and weakens, and even breaks, the social force which has the greatest, and occasionally altogether the only, opportunity to realize desires which are also our own. After all, Weber, as well as the staunch critic of the present socialism Habermas stated outright that bureaucracy is a form of rationalization characteristic of modern states. Therefore, the issue is to topple individual echelons of the bureaucracy, including, if need be, a specific government, rather than the bureaucracy [itself]. At the everyday level, we should strive for a permanent review of all executive apparatuses, sanctioned institutionally and legally, for criticism of all inefficiencies, to say nothing of inept and erroneous actions. The apparatus fully enlisted in conducting socialist renewal and the economic reform, which also has to be a reform in philosophy, politics, culture and customs, may and should become another source of great vigor, of a radical acceleration in the development of Poland.

Summing it all up, the stronger the social system is within which the opposition operates, the more creative is the role the opposition can play. Therefore, at issue is opposition to some institutions growing obsolete, to the elements of relations of production and superstructure which now restrain the development of productive forces rather than to the historic and Promethean attempt at scientific organization of collective life. In particular, at issue is opposition to poor execution, both in theory, when poor management mechanisms are devised, e.g. legal provisions, and in practice, when specific persons frequently implement the most correct intentions and scientifically well-grounded plans in a poor and haphazard manner. Such people should be simply assigned other work more fitting for them.

I see in this still more trump cards for Poland, still more resources of great vigor and potential for rapid changes. When an individual manages his life poorly, he, and eventually his immediate family, are the only ones to lose. When an industrialist manages inefficiently, he goes bankrupt, and if he acts rationally, he achieves wealth. When in our system the central planner made mistakes, their consequences were as much greater as the scope of his actions compared to an individual or a plant. Proper scientific operation amounts to a multiplicity of correct individual decisions. The law of multiplication which I have mentioned operates still more powerfully in this instance. Such are further opportunities for Polish universalist socialism, and the intrasystemic socialist opposition within it.

Snags Occur in Legislation, Consolidation of Farm Holdings

26000084 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 38, 18 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Adam Warzocha: "Between Farming Strips"]

[Text] Another law is being reworked, this one after having been in effect for 6 long years. In June 1988, the Sejm began to draft changes in regulations on consolidation. The changes are mainly for the purpose of improving technological efficiency and are supported by the consolidation practitioners. The essence of the draft changes lies in an article which was added, 3a, which radically increases the possibility of government-initiated consolidations. The provision is innocent, but it evokes fear because it provides freedom of choice in evaluating the situation. For example, consolidations can be begun by the government if the land is a patchwork of very narrow strips or small lots, each owned by someone else, and for that reason, difficult to farm. Deciding whether a patchwork is onerous, is not onerous (apparently there can be such), or is particularly onerous, will be more perplexing than reflecting on the definition of a built-up area, contained in a previous road code.

Those who actually work the land, as distinct from the so-called farmers from Marszałkowska St, look upon the institution of government-initiated consolidation with great suspicion. In People's Poland thus far, two laws governing proceedings in this important matter have been devised, because certainly consolidation is one way of greatly improving productivity. The January 1968 law provided that consolidation could be ordered, without any kind of consultative or nongovernmental formalities.

Abuse of the law by those deciding farm policy, especially in the latter half of the 1970's, provoked a hatred for consolidation by those who live off the land. As a result, in the Rzeszow-Ustrzyk agreements of February 1981, the text of which was published in ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIAŁY [Problems and Materials], a publication of the Ideology-Upbringing Press Department in the Central Committee, the government took upon itself

the task of preparing a new law. The March 1981 law, i.e., under martial law, gave the owners of the land full sovereignty in decisionmaking. The administrators and politicians who were involved with further improvements in agriculture, were given a very fundamental task: To publicize new rules for explaining that the new formula is not reminiscent of the hated integration and exchange of lands practiced in the second half of the 1970's.

Before 3 years had passed, the new law became the object of criticism. In justifying the draft of the changes, sent by the Council of Ministers to the Sejm early in June 1988, those employed in the Ministry of Agriculture wrote: "The present rate of land consolidation is decidedly inadequate and is declining each year."

Of the 18.7 million hectares of arable land in Poland, almost 2 million qualify for consolidation. In the last few years, scarcely 20,000-30,000 hectares are undergoing this process.

The statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture are strange, because in Rzeszow Voivodship alone, in 1988, in 17 villages 16,000 hectares are being consolidated. Two villages are waiting in line, because in this voivodship there is a queue for consolidation.

Some of the state administration and party apparatus charge the 1982 law with being inefficient, and particularly of being too democratic—referring to the requirement that half of those involved be in favor of consolidation.

Consultations were then begun, in accordance with the customs of the period of renewal. Two years ago, the local area received the documents for consultation, but in a very miserly amount, as if the government printing office were on its last legs. In Rzeszow Voivodship, the brochure containing the text for discussion, reached the agricultural secretary of the Voivodship Committee, who wrote in the margin of the versions of the changes: "This!" Or: "Not this!" There are 95,000 private farmers in the voivodship. The consultation rite would have been arduous using only one copy, therefore copies were reproduced at regional meetings with the aktiv. Naturally, the copies also contained the secretary's "this" and "not this" notations.

A widely scattered method of consultation has the advantage that in the ministry, or wherever it is that opinions from different places come together, it is possible to create results which reflect the view of the ministry, pretending that this is the will of the majority.

The change proposals contained a novel idea of what a majority is. Consideration was given to the provision that 25 percent of the farmers in a village who are in favor of consolidation constitutes a majority. As late as April 1988, the criterion of 25-percent majority existed

as the working version, alongside a proposal that administration offices be given the power to decree "consolidation where the patchwork is onerous." In the draft sent to the Sejm, the 25-percent majority clause was omitted.

In the summer of 1983, after scarcely a year since the new law was passed—the law constructed on the principle of voluntarism—one of the practicing geodesists predicted that when everything dies down, attempts will be made to restore government-initiated consolidation.

Janusz Skarbek, assistant director of the geodesy and land-management department in the Voivodship Office in Rzeszow, says that the people who want government-initiated consolidation restored are those who did nothing, although it was their duty, to publicize the 1982 law. Skarbek, in heated discussions with persons who say that the 1982 law is bad, asks them, "Why is it bad?" Because the consolidations are not taking hold. Then he says: "And what did you do to make them take hold? You met with the farmers and explained everything to them, and they are still against it?" No, we did not hold any informational meetings, but they are against consolidation.

Stanislaw Szczepanski, member of the agriculture commission in the ZSL Supreme Committee, says: "Unfortunately, in most voivodships very little was done to popularize consolidation. And this charge also applies to the Ministry of Agriculture. In this situation, a change in the consolidation law would absolve the entire, very long period of lack of initiative on the part of the administration and the political apparatus. The Sejm, too, could be used to grant absolution for inaction and laziness.

Rzeszow Voivodship furnishes convincing arguments that good results stem from the diligence of the local administration and the political apparatus. This is land so chopped up with paths and balks as almost nowhere else in the country. And this is the voivodship in which the countryside suffered the heavy consequences of the agrarian actions of the first leader of the voivodship and his inconsiderate staff in the second half of the 1970's. Along the international road, in the stretch from Rzeszow to Lancut, there were to be cooperative groups or complexes of fields, preferably sown with corn. It is in this voivodship that a local law was to be enacted, on the strength of which land would be taken away from those farmers who sell less to the state than the countryside average.

In order to create complexes of fields for socialized farms, a compulsory exchange of garden plots was conducted with great alacrity in Rzeszow Voivodship. In the exchange, private farmers received either a very bad plot of land, or a very poor price. This procedure was conducted on the basis of a government resolution, nowhere published. It was called "creating a new territorial structure." Fifty-nine villages in the voivodship suffered the effects of the creation of a new territory. Some of them twice. In 21 villages, the displacements

were conducted three times and in five villages, four times. Ultimately, by force and to the detriment of the government—because the compulsory exchanges were devastating to the reputation of the government in the countryside—1,560 field complexes were formed in Rzeszow Voivodship, on an area of over 25,000 hectares.

In 1981 these complexes fell apart. It was a repetition of the year 1956, when production-cooperative areas, integrated by force, were parceled out. In 1982 an accountant calculated the costs of creating complexes between 1976 and 1980. He was advised to keep the figures in his memory, because publishing them would inflame public opinion.

As a result of all of this, "normal" consolidations and "abnormal" consolidations became the same to the farmers. To them, everything was the loathed integrations. It was in such a situation that the new law on consolidation went into effect—with its principle of voluntarism in beginning the procedure of changing the run of the balk. The reaction to the government-initiated "abnormal" integration was a complete lack of interest in the work that needed to be done. How long this interruption will last depends on the intensity and sincerity of the administration's explanatory work.

In May 1988, Jerzy Szeremeta, deputy voivode in Rzeszow, in an interview for the newspaper "State Management and Administration," said: "The widespread knowledge about consolidation among the farmers, and their good attitude towards it, is already bringing results."

The voivodship administration conducted over 120 meetings in the countryside. Employees in the ZSL Voivodship Committee and the gmina committees went through a course of training. Rzeszow Voivodship, the only one in the country, published a folder with basic information, and the only poster, of a thought-provoking design—a farmer with a bushy, walrus mustache, against a background of two maps: on one, the preconsolidation reality (the balk lines merge because of their density), and on the other, postconsolidation views (clearly visible rectangles of fields).

In 1978 in Wola Zakroczymska near Lezajsk, consolidation work suddenly stopped. The geodesists' office was set afire and the geodesists fled. In this village, close to a forest, when something burns, something also explodes. In Wola Zarzycka ribbons of fields stretch 3-4 kilometers and are 3-4 meters wide. In May 1987, 75 percent of the farmers in Wola Zarzycka said they were in favor of consolidation. The work is underway. In Stobierna Village, in 1980, work was interrupted by a menacing protest. Now work is going on politely, with 80 percent of the farmers in favor of it.

In the interview mentioned above, the Rzeszow deputy voivode said: "The 1982 law worries many people, and mainly the provision that consolidation depends on the

will of the people, which in many cases could become an unsurmountable obstacle. The experience in our voivodship has proven that this is not so; furthermore, many very positive results ensue from this requirement."

In some voivodships, state officials and political workers went boldly into the field to reply to the doubts of the farmers. In other voivodships, they are proceeding in the old way—waiting at their desks and complaining that the provisions of the 1982 law are bad.

Every consolidation, even that ordered by the government, is better than what was before. The point is, at what cost is it conducted. Changes in the law, popularized by lazy conservatives, contain a provision which offers protection against bureaucratic abuse. The work of the geodesists must have the final approval of 50 percent of the farmers. Consolidation usually takes 3-4 years. After 4 years of geodetic work, ordered by the government, it may happen that the farmers do not approve the plan. True, the geodetic work alone is not very costly. Much more money is needed for postconsolidation work, after the plan is approved (elimination of balks and old roads, removal of brushwood, filling in ravines, land reclamation, construction of new roads and culverts... all of this at the expense of the state treasury). And after all, during these wasted 4 years the geodesists could be working in a village which approved consolidation.

There are two critical moments in this procedure. First, when the village is being convinced to agree to consolidation at all, and second, when the plan for a new form of plots and ownership is announced. The government-initiated consolidations merge these two crises into the same time period.

Deputies who live near steelmills, mines, palaces of culture, streetcars, etc., already know that consolidation in a village is an explosive mixture: Barns burn, dogs are poisoned, sand is poured into tractor engines, and fights and quarrels are the order of the day. As the village accepts the idea of changes in the run of balks, such mishaps occur less frequently. Government-ordered consolidation means certain escalation of misfortune in the village.

Practitioners believe that consolidation accepted from the beginning and conducted with the cooperation of the farmers is far better than that conducted on the basis of only information from surveyors and the administration, and the unfriendly silence of the village.

Overhauling the law by adding to it bureaucratic compulsion, is disturbing in a broader context. The explanation that the conservatives want to show who is governing the village, is shallow.

At a time when the activists who appear on television talk so much about "democracy," the revived methods of decreeing progress by compulsion must give pause for

thought, regardless of noble intentions. Those who before 1959 promulgated compulsory collectivization in the village had good intentions—more food for the people. The bureaucrats managing agriculture, who 15 years ago pressured the peasants to use artificial fertilizers, were also guided by good intentions—better crop yields. The ghost of compulsory collectivization is also looking over the shoulders of those who are promulgating government-initiated consolidation.

There is an error of logic in the belief that progress can be promulgated without drawing into the matter those who are affected by it. The extremely wise administration is doing good in behalf of unwise peasants, even if the peasants do not want it. An extreme faith in the mission of making people happy by methods of compulsion is a trait of "bureaucratic socialism," dedicated to rebuilding, we hear. We do not know in what other places they are preparing the next banners under which we must, by compulsion, march to progress and prosperity.

The administration and others are promulgating compulsory consolidation in order to have an excuse for their incompetence in discussions with the Polish countryside.

P.S. The Sejm will return to this matter in the fall session.

Church Mediator, Editor Comment on Current Events

Orszulik on Unions, Associations

26000099 Warsaw WALKA MŁODYCH in Polish
No 39, 25 Sep 88 pp 3, 14

[Interview with Fr Alojzy Orszulik, assistant secretary, Conference of the Polish Episcopate, by Jacek Jozwiak; date and place not given]

[Text]

Jozwiak: In the recent heated weeks the Roman Catholic Church, too, has participated in actions taken to calm the mood of the public. The pastoral words of bishop Majdanski and the voices of the bishops gathered at Jasna Gora have been quoted by all of the mass media.

Fr Orszulik: Bishop Majdanski's speech was made at the beginning of the strikes. It was very considered, prudent...

Jozwiak: ...necessary...

Fr Orszulik: Certainly it was necessary. Whether it satisfied the strikers I do not know. The fact is, the strike was not halted.

The bishops on Jasna Gora spoke out unequivocally in favor of the need to look for ways to build union and association pluralism. Anyway, this has been said many times by both the bishops and the pope. I think that if

this problem is not solved, it will not be possible to establish relevant relations in the workplace or relations between the authorities and the people who are not committed to the party.

Jozwiak: Is this not a proposal to reactivate Solidarity in its previous form?

Fr Orszulik: Most people from the Solidarity circles, including Lech Walesa, say that there can be no talk about a return to the old structures, to the old methods of functioning. Seven years have elapsed, changes in thinking have taken place, and a new generation has come along. This young generation is also very exasperated. It represents a somewhat different outlook, but the word Solidarity means for them a set of values with which an enormous amount of workers and people identify. A new formula is needed, one which, above all, would not have a political character. If it is possible now to have a certain political pluralism outside the unions, then the trade unions should be depoliticized. Otherwise the workplace will become an arena of political struggle. In accordance with the instructions of the "Laborem Exercens" encyclical, trade unions should not be dependent on any kind of political party or force. Their task is concern for safe working conditions, thrift in the enterprise, fair wages, and treatment of workers as persons and not objects.

Jozwiak: Is this depoliticized union pluralism supposed to be a cure for the crisis?

Fr Orszulik: There are no cures or miraculous solutions. But there are many elements which could help in overcoming the crisis. I have told my interlocutors, including the political ones, many times, that if the possibility of political pluralism is created on other planes, in other structures, then the trade unions, both party and non-party, will concern themselves with protecting the interests of the workforce and the enterprise. They will be committed to keeping the plant profitable. Otherwise, they will lose their jobs. Economic bonds unite human efforts.

Jozwiak: You spoke of pluralism on another plane... Is this the hope that discussion about the new law on associations brings with it?

Fr Orszulik: Associations are to be one of the forms of public activity. But the politicians officially announced that they are looking into the possibility of forming clubs and political organizations based on Catholic social science. But there should be no monopoly of Catholics, and no monopoly of marxists. Poland was always a tolerant country and allowed everyone to speak, including those who think differently—the nonbelievers and those who believe differently.

Jozwiak: And what does the Church see in the political area which would be good for it, for Poland, the nation, and the individual?

Fr Orszulik: An immediate search for forms and formulas is needed and the mobilization of all Poles to lead the country out of the crisis. The ruling party will not be able to do this alone, without society...

Jozwiak: Is this a proposal to form a Christian party?

Fr Orszulik: The Church has not expressed itself on the subject of creating a Christian party. Such a party would have to be based on Catholic social science and could not be another facade, of which there have been so many in our latest history. Anyway, I do not know whether the situation and society has yet developed to the point that we could have a multiparty or even a 2-party system. The people who belonged to the Church were excluded from public life during the entire past 40 years. There are no prepared Catholic political activists who would have experience in organizing work, in taking part in political life...

Jozwiak: In taking part? Perhaps this is said too strongly—maybe in leading, in exerting direct influence on certain matters...

Fr Orszulik: This is a very complex problem. The Catholic lay people could speak more competently. I am speaking as a person who has contacts with both the representatives of the authorities and the independent groups.

Jozwiak: What, at this time, is the opinion of the Church on the policies of the authorities? I am not referring to economic matters, but to democratization, new courses of action, etc.

Fr Orszulik: Up to now, the declarations of the authorities have been taken as verbalism, because so far we have learned nothing of significance.

Jozwiak: And so the new churches are nothing?

Fr Orszulik: Are the new churches being built for priests and bishops? They are being built for the people, and under their pressure. In some cases the bishops are not too delighted about this, because it is they who have to organize the means for the construction of a new church. The parish itself, particularly a new one, is not able to carry the entire burden of construction. But the needs of the faithful have to be considered. The people in authority often think that the building of a church is a privilege, yet this is a normal and inalienable right to which believing people are entitled.

Jozwiak: You said: verbalism...

Fr Orszulik: Please, sir, how much talk has there already been in Poland! It is time to start doing something. Permission should immediately be given for the formation of associations of various profiles—political, social, student, cultural, upbringing, and religious, and they should be allowed to have their own press. These are

forms in which people educate themselves and educate others. Please note that until now only youth organizations of a marxist character have been officially permitted. Even the Polish Scout Union was canvassed for party membership. If the youth from this traditionally worthy organization wants to have a connection with the Church, its leadership does not permit it. If a scout wants to enter a house of worship in his uniform, this is called a violation of the Union's secularity. Yet this is not a violation of secularity, but a violation of the party-affiliation of this organization. The Scouts Union should be depoliticized just as a student organization should be depoliticized. Allow young people of various philosophical outlooks to affiliate.

Jozwiak: You speak of depoliticization and immediately propose an alternative organization?

Fr Orszulik: That is not a paradox. The point is to join together, not to divide. Everyone should be where he feels that he is a part of something, where he is among people of similar outlooks. After all, the party has a full right to its own organizations, including youth organizations. But it cannot have a monopoly and control over everyone, because that is a falsification of reality. This society, by its nature and historical tradition, is pluralistic. Let us return to the trade unions. Even assuming that 7 million workers belong to them, there are still another 10 million who do not. If the new unions can solve everything, why is there a crisis? Why do these unions contribute to the setting up of an anticrisis pact and defend their monopoly? Why do they not make the authorities credible in international opinion? We must seek a formula under which people who are not affiliated with the present unions could also act in organized structures and jointly work to make the workplace a profitmaking one. If an enterprise is not profitable, then it is obvious to the whole world that it is going bankrupt. Our interlocutors on the government side have said many times that Gdansk Shipyard is not profitable. So we ask: why keep it, why not convert it? Give the workers an ultimatum: Try yourself to propose something which will restore it to profitability. We cannot permit ourselves to constantly subsidize, subsidize, subsidize. Where are the state authorities supposed to get the money from to cover factory deficits and pay foreign debts?

Jozwiak: Could you possibly be advocating a belt-tightening policy?

Fr Orszulik: I think that society would be ready to make some sacrifices. If the people saw some specific, I repeat, specific prospects, and were convinced that they will receive more than just words, words, words, from the political authorities... New names are needed, especially young people, on both the ruling side and on the side of independent public opinion.

Jozwiak: We are all waiting for specifics.

Fr Orszulik: Perhaps you young people should do more than just wait. As many young people as possible should be invited to take part in all kinds of activities for Poland. The legacy which we, your elders, are leaving you is frightening. The young, all of them, must immediately join in solving the country's problems. Because those are your problems and your tomorrow. They should seek everything which joins and brings together. Man is kin to man—he is not an animal. The young should be everywhere: in the state authorities, in the trade unions, whatever they may be, in various organizations and associations, in the state administration...

Jozwiak: And in the Church?

Fr Orszulik: Yes, in the Church, too, because that is what it teaches.

Jozwiak: Thank you for the interview.

Fr Orszulik: I, too, thank you. And Godspeed.

Editor Offers Disclaimer

26000099 Warsaw WALKA MŁODYCH in Polish
No 39, 25 Sep 88 pp 3, 14

[Editorial comment by Ludwik Luzynski]

[Text] In deciding on an interview with Father Orszulik we did not expect that he would sing hymns of praise for socialist reality. We assumed, first of all, that our interviewee, who performs a not unimportant role in the leadership circles of the Catholic Church in Poland, would formulate an opinion on the subject of current problems in our country and would attempt to point to some solutions, which in today's Poland, are indispensable. And that is what he did.

On the day that his statements were presented to him for authorization, the entire country was talking about General Kiszczak's meetings with representatives of different social circles, including a meeting with Lech Walesa at which the idea of a round table was discussed. We decided that in this situation we simply had to ask some additional questions, and particularly one: What, in the opinion of the Church, are the limits of compromise today? Unfortunately, our respected interlocutor did not accede to our wish and did not want to "add new elements" to the interview which had already been conducted. However, he added the following declaration to the authorized text of the interview: "I agree to publication of the foregoing text in the newspaper WALKA MŁODYCH on condition that it not be subjected to censorship."

The Church in our country, regardless of what its various representatives say, has played and is playing an active political role. It has given these aspirations different names, but political activity is what they called it the least. Whatever they called it, that is what it was called, and everyone sees what is really happening on the Polish

political scene and who is playing what role. Everyone wants the best for Poles, except that unfortunately everyone has a different opinion on what this best is. Hence the loud calls today for a compromise. A compromise is the more realistic the more rational (literally) are the starting points of view of the individual participants in the political struggle.

It is now that most of the irritations, myths and phobias, which do nothing to clarify the field of dialogue, reveal themselves. There are a few such moments in Father Orszulik's statements also. For example, to speak of trade unions in 1988 as being party affiliated is at least incomprehensible, if not a malicious insinuation. True, Alfred Miodowicz belongs to the PZPR, but a definite majority of the 7 million members are most probably part of the 85 percent group of Catholics in Poland. I do not want to be suspicious, but would they be eligible for another name if they were to lease themselves out to an American or West European union headquarters? Or perhaps it would be sufficient if their bosses reported once a week to Miodowa St. It is the same with the opinion on the subject of the party system in Poland. We have several political parties, one of which has a leading role, and history more than once has proved that relations between them have not always been idyllic. It is different in Poland and it is different in the West, but in the Vatican State, for example, there is only discipline. And what does this have to do with the truth of the statement that "people who belonged to the Church were excluded from public life during the entire past 40 years." It was sufficient, throughout these years, to be at religious ceremonies in the villages or small towns to ascertain that thousand of their participants were functionaries in the people's government. During all of this time there were Catholics in the Sejm. The truth is, however, that only a few made themselves available to the bishops, but that is already a matter of the conscience of the PAX or Christian Social Association member, not to mention PZPR, ZSL or SD members, and not the political system in Poland, as to whether they want to act on the instructions of the Church hierarchy or be guided by their own intellect.

Progress in democratization is verbalism, according to Father Orszulik. This despite the fact that many concrete decisions made during the last 7 years (for example, two amnesties), or the appointment of several new democratic institutions (Tribunal of State, Constitutional Tribunal, Spokesman for Civic Rights, Consultative Council under the chairman of the Council of State), took place as a result of appeals formulated by persons whose public activity is licensed by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. What, therefore, should be the real measure? It appears that it is not the conditions for practicing a religious cult—Father Orszulik has no reservations about them. Nor do the policies of the authorities on the building of churches arouse any doubts. The fact that the representatives of the Church are not satisfied that millions of young people go to church, that certainly a large part of the teaching and upbringing cadre go there also, has to be astonishing.

Would democracy take place if these millions of people each Sunday reported to church in uniform? Would the Polish Scout Union then be finally depoliticized? And would the Independent Association of University Students, as we remember it from 1981, be an example of a depoliticized student organization? To be precise, not one of the youth organizations in Poland requires that its members hold a particular philosophical view, yet the Father demands that "youth of various philosophies be permitted to affiliate..."

Daniel Passent, arguing recently with Jerzy Turowicz on totalitarianism, was right.

When we hear and read the statements of various representatives of the Catholic Church in Poland, the question persistently arises—are we living in the same country. (It is interesting that similar doubts are not felt when the representatives of other denominations express their views.) We should define this precisely before the round table discussions begin, otherwise its participants will spend too much time describing the real state of affairs in Poland and society is truly impatient.

Second, from what we hear, in the dialogue which has been begun the Church is supposed to act as mediator and moderator. If Father Orszulik's views are not in conflict with the views of the hierarchy, there may be a question as to whether this is a third party to the dialogue. It would also be well to accurately inform society about this. On condition, of course, that we want to honestly make public life transparent and society the direct sovereign of the State.

Emigre Communities in West, USSR, 'Polonia' Firms Discussed

26000064 Warsaw REPORTER in Polish
No 7, Jul 88 pp 21-23

[Interview with Jozef Klasa, secretary general, Society for Contacts With Poles (Living) Abroad "Polonia," by Anna Ostrzycka and Marek Rymuszko: "Many Ways, the Same Roots"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

REPORTER: It is estimated that some 13 million Poles and persons of Polish descent are living outside of Poland and that figure amounts to nearly one-third of today's population in Poland. Two and a half million of these Poles were born on the Vistula. The emigration figures for 1955-79 estimate that nearly 800,000 persons have left Poland while the Foreign Ministry's data shows that in 1980-87, about 370,000 Polish citizens left Poland for temporary visits and never returned. At the same time, 265,000 permanently emigrated from Poland. You have said that after the Chinese, Italians and Germans, Poles rank fourth for the number of

emigrants compared to the country's total population. It is an old truth that it does no good to get mad at the facts but you will admit that these figures give us nothing to be glad about.

Klasa: That is true. Poland is one of the world's leaders for emigration. However, please remember that this is a phenomenon with a long and complicated history. People were emigrating from Poland long before the change in its government and economic system. Let us not forget the great emigrations during the Partitions, during the 1920's and because of World War II. In certain aspects, Poland resembles countries like Turkey, Greece or Ireland where there was also large-scale emigration of people looking for work and better living conditions.

This does not change the fact that our present painful economic crisis has created in Poland a totally new situation and led to the latest wave of emigration. The cause of the present exodus is very complex and can be traced back to the second half of the 1970's. Poland does not seem to have any institutions or organizations anywhere within the government, Church or the "Polonia" society that do not view this phenomenon with alarm. Everyone agrees that in patriotic and moral terms, emigration is not a good thing. However, everyone or nearly everyone also agrees that despite the fact that although government methods of stemming emigration are the most convenient measures, they are also the least effective. That is simply not the only way to deal with the problem. Furthermore, since emigration is already as high as it is, we may be alarmed about the situation but there is no reason why those who have left Poland should be cut off from any possibility of maintaining contact with the Fatherland. This does not of course apply to persons who live abroad to conduct activity inimical to the interests of their state and nation. For them there can be no understanding or tolerance. Fortunately, this group constitutes only a very small percentage of Poles living abroad.

REPORTER: However, you will not deny that some Polonia organizations have little faith in the credibility and more importantly the stability of the policy we are discussing.

Klasa: Yes but there is another side to that. I will tell you more: Poles living abroad have certain reasons to show distrust because as a group, their memories and experiences come from recent decades and are often too bitter to lend themselves to any sense of optimism. Let us simply say that even at this time, there still exist barriers to the realization of a policy of openness. The source of these barriers is usually to be found in anachronistic regulations that urgently need changing because they were established at a time in the past when contacts with Poles abroad were entirely different. This is especially true of some persistent formal and legal regulations on tourism, restrictions on ownership of property within Poland by Poles living abroad and many others. All of

these obstructions should be eliminated as soon as possible if we want to reach the goals we have set. And no chance of success is possible with the "for our own good" or dilatory approach to contacts with Poles abroad which are manifested by having a policy of openness only for the purpose of gaining whatever benefit we can. This is true first of all because the times have changed and second, because the limit to trust has been crossed.

Let us put the matter this way: we are genuinely and vitally interested in Poles living abroad being able to freely visit our country, knowing its history, culture and current problems, preserving the Polish language wherever they live and helping to build Poland's prestige in the world. These are our unalienable national goals which we cannot renounce simply because there is no other way.

REPORTER: Do there exist any limits to the closeness of our contacts with Poles living abroad?

Klasa: The "Polonia" Society feels that we should deal with our compatriots abroad even when their views on some basic matters differ from ours. However, we see the entire problem in its patriotic and national aspects. We say: "There is but one Poland and that is here and now." For that reason, we want to cooperate with everyone, even those who disagree with us, as long as they do not seek to overthrow our government or harm the Polish state.

It is our intention that such an approach be confirmed by the 3rd Congress of Scholars of Polish Descent which is supposed to be held in July 1989. This congress can be attended by any Polish scholar who wishes to come regardless of their political beliefs and how they may have left Poland. The only criterium for attendance at this congress will be the academic achievements of the interested person.

REPORTER: Will scholars like professor Leszek Kolakowski who left Poland during the wave of emigration after March 1986 also be allowed to attend?

Klasa: That depends on them.

REPORTER: One of the most controversial issues in emigration is the still-unresolved problem of dual citizenship. As we know, some emigres become citizens of their newly adopted countries, but our government does not recognize those foreign citizenships. In other words, these people are regarded by Poland as Polish citizens. This creates special problems when these individuals present their foreign passports for visas to visit Poland. With the older generation of emigres, the practice has been to silently tolerate their second citizenship. However, what is to be done about new emigres and how long is this vague legal situation to continue?

Klasa: Unfortunately, there is not too much agreement about how these problems are going to be resolved. The "Polonia" Society has taken the position that the holding of a second citizenship by a Pole living abroad should not stop him or her from maintaining family or business contacts with Poland or from returning to visit. The letter of the 1962 law on Polish citizenship does not allow such contact and we therefore feel that the best solution would be to treat the passport of Poles living in, for example, the United States, France or Great Britain, as a travel document rather than a certificate of citizenship. We submitted the Council of State a recommendation that Poles living abroad with passports issued by a country which regards that document as proof of citizenship be allowed complete freedom to come to Poland.

Another and equally important problem is consular passports. We suggest that they be replaced with a single passport to be used by all Poles regardless of whether they live in Poland or abroad. We think that this matter must be regulated according to the state's present policy on Poles abroad.

REPORTER: You suggested a single unified passport. Good. But what about the currency exchange requirements? Representatives of foreign travel bureaus say that Poland is one of the most expensive countries in the world for tourists because of the unheard of and horrendous prices one pays for hotel rooms at the black-market exchange rates. This practice brings the state only short-term financial benefits while in the long run, we lose a great amount of foreign currency when tourists who might visit Poland are scared off once they realize the cost of such a trip. This is true even of members of Polonia organizations despite the fact that they enjoy the benefit of a lower rate of obligatory exchange.

Klasa: This is another exceptionally complicated problem, one made all the more difficult by the fact that the level and quality of tourist services offered in Poland do not in any way justify the high prices tourists must pay. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the present crisis makes it an urgent matter for our government to obtain foreign currency. What is worse is that the mechanism we are discussing has a tendency to perpetuate the crisis to the point of absurdity. The worse our financial crisis (and Poland's debt is growing), the tighter they turn the screws on tourists including visiting emigres which in turn discourages them from visiting our country.

Generally, all of this proves that foreign tourism in Poland has reached a profound conceptual and fiscal crisis and the situation is one that cannot continue much longer. This is especially true now when someone with hard currency cannot exchange it in a bank at a rate close to the free-market value.

REPORTER: Even if the money is not exchanged, it will still be spent on the black market and remain in Poland where it will go to Pewex and Baltona shops and finally to the state coffers.

Klasa: That is true and that is why tourism cannot grow on such unhealthy principles by which I mean burdening our foreign guests with the results of an unfavorable ratio between the official and black-market exchange rates. However, we must also be realistic. For example, we in the "Polonia" Society cannot demand a total repeal of obligatory currency exchange because that would run against economic logic. In the end, it is also true that, thanks to the discrepancy between the official and free-market exchange rates, the outside influx of foreign currency into Poland makes it possible for one to buy a very good dinner here for just two dollars. But the same tourists must also pay much more for a 2-bed hotel room than he would on Majorca.

With regard to Poles living abroad, the entire problem has another moral and civil dimension and something has to be done with this. For our part we propose that Polish citizens no longer be required to exchange foreign currency. We have estimated that the sums are not large, no more than 6 million dollars per year, and the benefit we do receive from this exchange could certainly be much greater.

REPORTER: Poles have more legal and fiscal difficulties in maintaining contact with the fatherland. For example, let us take the economic sphere. Here one continually feels the effects of a political allergy to having foreign firms owned by Poles abroad operating in Poland. Some persons in the state apparatus who have influence over legislation are chronically allergic to such business.

Klasa: Please take a little broader look at the issue. What we do not want is for our legislation on foreign contacts to remain rooted in distant years which were characterized, and I do not hesitate to say so, by Stalinist thinking. The Stalinist legacy consists of our still-unsolved problems of property, limitations on the ownership of real estate by persons living outside of Poland and finally the legal barriers that make it impossible to fully exploit foreign economic and ethnic potential. All of these are the relics of old political concepts about emigration and the West as a whole. These concepts have been discarded but the regulations remain in place.

The matter is somewhat better in the area of economy. Despite the fact that their activity has and sometimes continues to show some irregularity, the Polonia firms have been generally successful. Unfortunately, their growth has not been helped by factors like the enormous congestion and differences in regulations and voluntaristic decisions by government organs.

All of these issues must be unambiguously regulated in the spirit of the second stage of economic reform. If profound economic reforms are to be consistently realized in Poland, then we must also create better and more encouraging conditions for investment in our country. It must also be clearly stated that the possibility for the participation of foreign capital in Poland will be limited

in the future by the state's attitude toward private initiative as a whole. The state must simply define where in the sphere of production and services private industry can function. Only then will Polish capital from abroad gain the opportunity for correct and stable business which will bring profit to our economy as well. And it is worth adding that this is not a negligible amount of capital and is estimated at around \$20-40 billion.

I would also like to categorically reject the doctrinaire accusations one encounters here and there that such an option means that we are renouncing some "political principles" or that it is a "sell-out of socialism." When I hear this, I always respond by asking what principle is being renounced. The principle of a drab assortment of goods? The principle of a poor consumer market? These are not principles of socialism!

In my opinion, we need to completely change the way we think. Why, for example, when the Polish state is grievously in debt but its citizens have dollars, not make it possible for businesses to use those dollars? It is also absolutely essential to create a single law on foreign businesses and throw out the two current statutes, the "Polonia" law of 1982 and the later one on partnerships involving foreign capital. We must have real legal guarantees for economic activity. Without them, we cannot attract Polish ethnic capital from abroad. In the end, it is a bitter paradox pointed out by foreign Polish businessmen that they find it more profitable to invest in the USSR and certain other socialist states than in the country of their birth.

REPORTER: Let us talk about a few other issues. A couple of times, you have said that the Church in Poland has a positive role in foreign Polish communities.

Klasa: That is right. We have a high opinion of the Church's actions. In particular, we see much merit in how Polish ministries abroad have helped Poles maintain contact with the Motherland and in promoting Polish traditions, culture and language. This is an area in which both sides can cooperate. For example, let us consider the need to jointly publish a textbook for Poles abroad and also organizing certain public events.

REPORTER: Is the ministry opposed to such initiatives?

Klasa: On different occasions, both sides have opposed initiatives. One still sees certain signs of the old habits and prejudices and a mutual distrust that has formed over the years. However, we must overcome these barriers. We feel that it is very important to join our efforts in promoting the Polish language and teaching it to Polish youth born abroad. The Church has done much in this area and we respect that work.

REPORTER: Recently, the taboo has been dropped on still another subject and that is Poles living in the Soviet Union.

Klasa: And in other countries including other socialist countries. Owing to their large number (1,200,000 and second only to the number of Poles in the United States), the Poles in the Soviet Union are for us the most important group. But let us not forget that there are also 70,000 Poles in Czechoslovakia and 40,000 in the GDR.

We have made a real breakthrough in the USSR. In Poland, we have very high regard for the changes we see taking place in the Soviet Union. These changes throw an entirely new light on the problems of the Polish ethnic minorities, especially in Lithuania, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Latvia where Polish groups are largest. There has emerged a climate in which Poles living in the USSR can meet their linguistic, cultural and educational needs. At the same time, there is no way one can get around the fact that these people best understand the importance and meaning of cooperation between Poland and the USSR and that they should become the proverbial "salt" for such cooperation.

The Soviet authorities have been very cooperative with us. For example, they recently agreed to allow children from Polish ethnic groups to visit our country for vacation camps and courses in Polish language and culture. For the first time, the festival in Rzeszow will also be attended by a Polish group from the Soviet Union and 20-40 Soviet scholars of Polish descent will participate in the congress in July of next year that I already described.

Recently, we finished discussions about the organization of "Rodina" and during these talks, all of the issues were discussed with great openness and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. I would also like to take this opportunity to point out that this has removed one of the greatest causes of distrust toward "Polonia" in the West and that is the fact that we have up to now not been too concerned with Poles in the Soviet Union.

We are also working actively to develop our contacts with Poles in other socialist countries. In Hungary, the Jozef Bem Polish Association celebrated its 30th anniversary in May of this year and held a ceremony which was attended by the chairman of the "Polonia" Society, Witold Mlynczak. Our relations with the Polish Cultural and Educational Association in Czechoslovakia are also improving. We have also been talking with the Wladyslaw Warnenczyk Association in Bulgaria and Polish combat veteran's organizations in Yugoslavia.

REPORTER: You have not said anything about the GDR.

Klasa: No, I have not.

REPORTER: Then please explain why the "Polonia" Society has developed an interest in contacts with the foreign Polish-Jewish community? We are asking because the matter has not been explained too clearly in public enunciations.

Klasa: Until 1967, "Polonia's" contacts with the foreign Polish-Jewish community were rather lively. After the Arab-Israeli war and especially after the events in March of that year, these contacts were frozen and I think that there is no longer much point in saying whose fault that was. What is important is that the Polish-Jewish community and especially those who once lived in Poland have for some time shown a strong interest in our country. There is no reason to oppose their expectations, all the more so as so many Jews are a part of the Polish community. To put it simply, we think that such contacts are in Poland's good interests.

REPORTER: And to continue the last question, what about tomorrow?

Klasa: We have many specific plans which, and we believe this deeply, will make it possible for Poles living abroad to have closer relationships with the fatherland. We are also thinking of changing "Polonia" into an organization that would not only represent our country to our compatriots abroad but also represent them here at home. This change would be brought about by reconstituting the society's leadership to include representatives from the emigre community. Of course, that is not an easy matter but we still think that this is an idea worth a lot of consideration.

I also think that the time has come to start thinking about organizing the 3rd Congress of Poles Living Abroad to be held here in Poland. This conference was planned for 1939 but the outbreak of World War II ended that. Today especially, we have everything we need to hold that congress.

REPORTER: Thank you very much for speaking with us.

YUGOSLAVIA

President of Slovene Youth Organization Interviewed

28000023 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
4 Oct 88 pp 16-18

[Interview with Jozc Skolc, president of Slovene youth organization ZSMS, by Davor Butkovic: "Conflict of Two Concepts"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Jozc Skolc, the president of the Slovene youth organization (ZSMS) [Socialist Youth League of Slovenia], who was elected as a candidate opposing Janez Jansa, is one of those Slovene politicians whose public statements and political culture differ to some extent from the average Yugoslav political milieu. The articulation and arguments used to present certain theses, which even on our apparently completely uncontrolled political scene are still perceived as problematical, lend

undoubted dignity to the work of what is perhaps the most active and "most problematical" Yugoslav political organization, which is headed by that 28-year-old political scientist.

DANAS: In view of several disagreements, how would you describe the position of the Slovene youth organization within the framework of the SSOJ [Socialist Youth League of Yugoslavia]?

Skolc: The position of the ZSMS within the Yugoslav youth organization cannot be understood without also taking into account its position in Slovenia. The Slovene youth organization has a very influential role within the constellation of political forces in Slovenia, in contrast to the youth organizations in other federal units. Consequently, when we are in the SSOJ, on one hand we are theoretically equal, but on the other hand, we, who are still conducting our own youth policy which is frequently in conflict with republic policy, do not have relevant partners within the SSOJ with whom we could discuss things at an adequate level. This is because the representatives of the other youth organizations are not relevant in many respects, and are not relevant even on their own turfs. Thus, we have certain projects, which we know cannot be resolved within Slovenia, but we do not have partners in the SSOJ with which we could discuss those projects. The most evident conflicts, however, like the conflict at one time over the Relay Race, occur for other reasons.

DANAS: Do you think that what lies behind these conflicts, as well as what lies behind the marginalization of the other youth organizations, is their excessively close ties to the LC, and their complete lack of independence?

Skolc: It is difficult to say exactly who belongs to whom. There are people within the youth organization who would like to work more independently. There are several obstacles to working independently, however. One of them is the ties to individual republics and leaderships, followed by significant professional obstacles, knowledge, and an extremely poor selection of personnel. We all know of several examples—from the Relay Race to last year's election of the president of the SSOJ, who could not be elected until certain letters came from the LCY Central Committee. It is difficult to speak of the SSOJ's being independent from the party.

DANAS: Why doesn't the SSOJ come forward with at least partially clear positions on the events in Kosovo and Serbia, and why isn't it taking any position at all?

Skolc: Probably, as I mentioned, because of the ties of the people in the SSOJ with the republic leaderships, because of their lack of independence, and because of the lack of their own projects. It is certain that there is obstruction of decision making in the Yugoslav youth organization, but it is difficult to show quite precisely how that obstruction comes about. For instance, back in

August we made preparations to have a group of computer experts go to Kosovo to assist in computer literacy education. We wanted to make it a federal-level action, so we included the SSOJ in it. Suddenly several insurmountable obstacles appeared, and not in the youth organization. The entire action, in fact, would have cost 17 billion old dinars, which is really a laughable figure, but it nevertheless represented a major problem for the federal institutions. In spite of the verbal support for improving the situation in Kosovo, I have the impression that many people in the federal institutions are not at all interested in changing anything much, but rather in exploiting Kosovo in order to conduct a certain policy in Belgrade. Naturally, it is difficult to accuse individuals, but that is how the system functions.

DANAS: You spoke about the ties between the youth leaderships and the republic leaderships. In connection with this, do you think that such an open division in assessing the situation in Serbia and Kosovo may also occur in the youth organization, along with all the consequences of such a division?

Skolc: Frequently it is precisely the youth organization that has been the battlefield where the balance of forces has been tested. In this specific case, I do not think that the youth organization can take a concrete position on the Kosovo problem before that is done by the other political organizations; it especially will not be able to take a position in some unhindered way of its own. Nevertheless, I hope that if we cannot take a position on this, that we will not get into fights and discussions, which would certainly not be autonomous ones.

DANAS: Recently there has been more and more discussion about the future of the SFRY. One study conducted in Slovenia showed that a considerable number of Slovenes feel that they would be better off outside the federation. Slovenia is often accused of separatism. What is the position of the ZSMS on that problem?

Skolc: Slovenia is small, Yugoslavia is small, and we are accordingly oriented toward Europe and the world. Above all, the framework of our ambitions is Europe, however. But that opening toward Europe is usually discredited by the thesis that Slovenia, and to some extent Croatia insofar as Alpe-Adria is concerned, would themselves like to go to Europe. When I say that both Slovenia and Yugoslavia are confining for us, I am thinking that the entire country should open up to Europe. When one follows integration processes in the world, one can see a tendency toward rounding out regional entities. Furthermore, it is evident that the European barriers between East and West are falling, and in this regard, it is interesting that Yugoslavia is the only country that has not yet realized that the Cold War has ended. Young people are naturally the generation that no longer belongs to the Yalta division, and that division no longer concerns them; they see their ambitions in Europe. There are also technological reasons, issues of the infrastructure and the flow of information.

Any discussion of development ends at the borders of Yugoslavia. For that reason it is necessary to originate an initiative to reexamine Yugoslavia's European policy, and also because of the need to join the European economic associations.

DANAS: Nevertheless, how, specifically, would you comment on the thesis that sometimes appears in public that Slovenia would be better off outside the borders of the SFRY?

Skolc: That is a thesis that has almost never appeared officially in Slovenia, or has appeared in those newspaper columns which carry articles from other Yugoslav newspapers. I am not saying that there are no persons who think that way, but they get virtually no space in the Slovene press. That thesis, however, can always serve as the starting point for attacks against the Slovenes, and as a pretext for accusing the Slovenes of having something against the federation. Here, I would consider that thesis in the light of different views of the development of Yugoslavia. In that context, it can serve as a means of defaming the Slovene, or rather the democratic, approach to getting out of the crisis, an approach which concerns all of Yugoslavia. That democratic approach is dominant in Slovenia, and has adherents throughout the country, but it can be defamed in several ways. The two main ones are mentioning some sort of Slovene separatism and attacks against the Army. Those are the two strongest instruments, which are frequently used to frustrate any initiative coming from Ljubljana or Zagreb. The condemnations from that arsenal do not permit any discussion. They are a priori disqualifications without any reservations.

DANAS: In your opinion, is that the reason for the increasingly more pronounced negative sensitivity of a considerable portion of the Yugoslav public toward many events in Slovenia?

Skolc: It is difficult to say how much of it is rational, but that negative sensitivity is derived from a struggle between two concepts. In fact, the side to which we here also belong to some extent has a much weaker propaganda machinery. It produces good slogans, but it does not cover the whole territory of the country. Another aspect of that animosity is apparent in blaming the problems of another area on us. The less developed like to say that we in the north are developed and that we are exploiting them. When people get in line for bread, it is not difficult to convince them that they are standing in line because someone in Slovenia is throwing bread away. Furthermore, it is certain that the conflict between the two concepts is not academic in nature, but rather embraces a whole range of interests, including the interests of individual cliques and individual politicians, but also of the economy, which has been below world standards for a long time now, as well as of certain strong public institutions which have been overtaken by time

but do not want to let go of their share of the pie. The line of demarcation between those concepts does not just follow republic boundaries, but also exists within the republics.

DANAS: Some people who favor the Slovene political climate can be heard to say that certain events in the Slovene public have had a counterproductive effect, and that they have discredited the positive aspects of what is going on in Slovenia.

Skolc: The advantage of what is happening in Slovenia does not lie in the constant effusion of exclusively good and productive ideas, but rather in the fact that room has been opened up for dialogue and discussion. Naturally both good and bad ideas are presented, but the advantage is that a discussion can occur at all. I am convinced that there are people with good ideas everywhere, but there is no room to disseminate those ideas. Slovenia's advantage is precisely that to a great extent room has been opened up for discussion.

DANAS: But when conflicts and excesses occur in that room which has been opened up, who is responsible for arbitrating; is an arbitrator necessary?

Skolc: I think that the point is not that we need an arbitrator, although for the time being it is the party. Those forces—I am speaking of Slovenia—which have won that room for discussion are strong enough to provide support to progressive ideas, and to oppose conservative ones.

DANAS: Another significant aspect of Slovenia's negative image is the attitude toward the Army.

Skolc: In order to assert that Slovenia is against everything, against God, against the state—I won't give the whole list—people stir up disputes with the Army and say that the Army is not respected in Slovenia, and that it is insulted. That is naturally the most effective instrument for convincing people in other areas that something is wrong in Slovenia. I am more inclined to wonder whether the Army deliberately joined in the conflict between the two concepts, or whether someone dragged it in.

DANAS: Is it possible to assess, with at least approximate accuracy, the ties between the ZSMS and its presumed "base"?

Skolc: A study was conducted when the youth congress was held in Belgrade. Questions were asked about the influence of the youth organizations and testimonials to their work. It was shown that most of these testimonials were in Slovenia, and that the youth organization was really working on what those polled recognized as their own problems. I think that about 76 percent of the responses were positive. Such results surprised both me and many others. Since then, testimonials to the work of the ZSMS have increased continually. It is certainly one

of the political organizations in Slovenia which is most trusted by the people. That can be confirmed by the TELEKS survey at the time of the Ljubljana trial. A question was asked about who was most trusted in connection with everything surrounding the trial. The possible responses referred to the Committee [for the Defense of Human Rights], MLADINA, the ZSMS republic conference, and the federal bodies. MLADINA and the republic conference were chosen by 35 percent, and the Committee by 15 percent, which means 50 percent, since we did a great deal in conjunction with the Committee. About 2 percent of those polled trusted the federal bodies and the military institutions.

DANAS: When people talk about the current Slovene political situation, it is frequently emphasized, as it was at the spring party conference, that almost everyone in Slovenia supports what the party is doing. What is the attitude of the ZSMS toward the policy of the Slovene party, and how does the ZSMS feel about such unanimity?

Skolc: The essential thing that the party did, and on which it is working, is the attempt to accept those new ideas, to become open to discussion itself, without having an a priori position that it is omniscient and that it has to originate everything, but rather taking others as partners in the discussion. What is interesting to the ZSMS is that we have never taken a precise position with respect to that party program.

At any rate, several things which have now gained greater recognition in Slovene policy are a consequence of youth initiatives. Perhaps the youth organizations had more influence upon processes within the party than vice versa, especially with respect to the issues of restructuring the economy, small business, and energy. At one time these were our major issues, and now, when the party has accepted them, we cannot therefore oppose what we earlier advocated ourselves. On the contrary, we are glad that those issues have become part of "high-level" policy. We are now turning to other problems.

DANAS: But the positions of the ZSMS do not have anything in common with any sort of national homogenization, with the constant emphasizing of the Slovene national identity, which is frequently cited by Slovene politicians.

Skolc: I completely agree with that. We are not dealing with any sort of national program, if I may put it that way. We are not claiming that certain things are happening just because they are happening in Slovenia. That is a cheap trick. For instance, when I speak of the conflict between the two tendencies, I do not say that this has to do with the Slovene way out of the crisis, but rather with a form of the democratization of Yugoslavia. That democratization cannot take place at the republic level, much less at the ethnic level.

DANAS: Why, then, do Slovene politicians need to cite Slovene national feelings so often?

Skolc: The fact is that a national homogenization is taking place in Yugoslavia, and people talk constantly about which nation is most threatened, and points can certainly be gained on that basis. The issue over which things have been exacerbated, however, an issue which is not just national but rather a matter of civilization, is the Slovene language. Language is the issue on which all Slovenes can agree immediately, as well as a large part of the democratically oriented Yugoslav public, which is aware of the significance of language, both for the individual and for the people.

DANAS: Do you think that there would not have been so much negative reaction to the trial of Jansa, Zavrl, Tasic, and Borstner if the trial had been held in Slovene?

Skolc: So many unclear and unexplained questions arose in connection with the trial that I maintain that it is quite natural that the public became upset. Certainly the neglect of the Slovene language was the last straw, however. That definitely shook any confidence people had in the professionalism and good intentions of the court. Look, I was born close to the Italian border. There, if we speak about language, people say things like, "My father was in the Army, he served Franz Jozef and he spoke German; my husband was in the Army between the two wars, and he spoke Italian; my son in the Army speaks Serbo-Croatian." In the last few generations, so much injustice and frustration has accumulated that this sensitivity is not unusual. A great deal of it happened through the struggle for language, for example, the forced change of names, so that language is the point, with respect to the trial as well, which cannot be considered a mistake, but rather a direct provocation.

DANAS: In view of the fact that the election for president of the ZSMS and Jansa's imprisonment coincided, how did you feel, as Jansa's rival candidate?

Skolc: Yes, Jansa was in jail at the time of the election for president. I certainly did not feel very happy. What else can I say?

DANAS: How would you comment on the statement by the Maribor student representatives, who considered Jansa's nonelection to be a betrayal?

Skolc: If one joins in a political game like elections, and if one has already consented to the rules of conduct within the framework of that game, one must behave in such a way that both options, both victory and defeat, can be accepted. Another essential thing is that betrayal and the statement by the Maribor ZSMS members were discussed at the conference itself, but the Maribor university organization still has not taken a position on it even today. Furthermore, it is interesting that Janez Jansa still considers himself a member of the ZSMS, while the president of the Maribor university conference,

as I have said, does not consider himself a member of the Slovene youth organization. Let us say that it is expected that people who work in politics should not speak in passion.

DANAS: You have already said that MLADINA, the ZSMS, and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights act jointly on many things. Does the ZSMS support all the activities of the Committee, which is also frequently attacked in the Yugoslav press?

Skolc: The ZSMS supported the founding of the Committee, and we have someone in the Committee's board, and the Committee's program consists of four items. We support all activities by the Committee which are aimed at achieving those four items.

DANAS: What will the ZSMS do if the appeals by Jansa and Zavrl are not upheld, or if they even get stiffer

sentences? At one time people were talking about general strikes, mass demonstrations...

Skolc: In the first place, I am convinced that the trial should be annulled or returned to the lower court, because of all the errors made during the trial. If that does not happen, all extraordinary legal means that are technically possible should be tried. There is a possibility of seeking a review of the trial. All technical possibilities should be utilized. It is precisely because one must know that any other action going beyond that legal area could be turned against us, and that it may become part of the scenario—it is said that the trial was held according to a scenario. All those actions outside the legal sphere may also be an expression of people's anger, but they may likewise provide a justification for the institution of an emergency situation. Consequently, any such action seems very debatable and dangerous to me.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Seminar for Western Managers Organized
AU2411184588 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 24 Nov 88 p 10

[Article by Gabor Steingart: "Western Managers Trained in Creativity According to Plan"]

[Excerpts] Potsdam, 23 November—A week-long seminar for Western executives that provided training in modern management was held in the GDR. Together with leading cadres from GDR industry, representatives of FRG and Austrian enterprises were taught "methods for solving problems creatively." [passage omitted]

This first East-West event in this field was organized by a consortium of various GDR colleges and universities under the leadership of the state Construction Academy. Well-known enterprises such as the Babcock BSH AG machine-building concern, West Berlin Babcock Borsig AG, and six Austrian enterprises (including the state-owned AGR Linz chemical works, Waagner Biro AG, and the Porr International AG construction company) sent representatives to Potsdam—in spite of a participation fee of DM3,200. [passage omitted] Management theory was not the only topic that was discussed in Potsdam. The discussions on the sidelines of the seminar frequently centered on the state of East-West economic relations. All talks were characterized by the GDR's desire to make progress in this difficult field of cooperation.

GDR university professors Dimitar Iwanow [as received] from the Economics University and Dieter Klein from Humboldt University had come to Potsdam to discuss these topics. Iwanow spoke about "innovation perspectives of the nineties," and his colleague Klein gave a lecture on "New Thinking—New Acting."

According to Western participants, Iwanow drew "a committed and positive balance sheet" of economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Hungary; he also introduced the topic of joint ventures. "Iwanow considers joint ventures a viable way for the GDR in the foreseeable future," Modl from the Agro Linz Co. pointed out. [passage omitted]

Economist, S&T Director Comment on Economic
Pace, COCOM List
23000038 Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in
German No 42, 14 Oct 88 pp 40-44

[Article by Klaus Goeppert: "Fear of the Technology Gap"]

[Text] GDR top management wants to improve efficiency by applying Western management methods. If that cannot be accomplished, they fear a growing technological gap will develop. At GDR invitation, WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE editor Klaus Goeppert had a week-long opportunity to talk with industry leaders.

East Berlin's Nicolai area along the banks of the Spree river reflects the new self-confidence of the GDR: renovated old buildings, Berlin houses reconstructed on the basis of historical blueprints and imaginative variations of the usual dreariness of GDR concrete-alab buildings, have been put together to form idyllic inner-city areas with pubs and small shops that somewhat remind the Western visitor of the new shopping arcades at home. A small turnabout: Honecker and friends do not only want to build more, but also higher quality, housing. The striving for new quality is noticeable everywhere in the GDR economy. More than 30 interhotels are offering the standards of Western business accommodations, and more are under construction, such as Berlin's "Dom-Hotel," built with the Western know-how of Dywidag.

The economy of the GDR needs to be able to keep up with the West. Prof Erich Freud, board chairman of the GDR-FRG Trade Association, notes, "The issue is no longer to set up an industry, but to make it modern." Adding, "We have to design more spectacular products and bring them to the world market. We hardly ever did that in the past."

The experts are talking openly about the problems of the GDR economy. Karlheinz Arnold, deputy director general of the "Fritz Heckert" Combine in Karl Marx Stadt, which specializes in the manufacture of numerically controlled machine tools, says, "We have to address our problems openly, otherwise we will be unable to solve them."

However, merely talking about them will not be sufficient by a long shot. The GDR has not yet recovered from the effects of the oil shock in the early 1970's, when the USSR cut her exports to the GDR. "We have been skidding. Conditions have deteriorated drastically," complains Prof Harry Nick, director of political economic research of the Academy of Social Sciences at the SED Central Committee and advisor to GDR Chief Economist and Politburo Member Guenter Mittag.

In the 1970's, when the petrochemical industry was in its development stage, the energy supply had to be reconverted to coal. To curb the road transports and hence preserve gasoline, the GDR was forced to overhaul its track system and shift the antiquated railroads to electricity. Such unforeseeable developments disrupted the economic growth of the GDR very severely and forced its industry to adopt extraordinary efforts that created problems, GDR economists explain. For instance, the "Hans Beimler" Locomotive Construction and Electrotechnical Plant at Henningsdorf near Berlin, which used to export up to half of its production, is now using almost all its capacity to manufacture electrolocomotives for the domestic market—slow, conventional machines, technically vastly overtaken by the high-speed trains Western producers are working on. There is a bit of resignation in the words of Martin Bunge, one of the director general's two deputies, "We are sticking to our principle of being everywhere on the market and in business."

At least, the industrial reorganization had a positive effect on domestic growth. During the first half of the 1980's, the GDR achieved growth rates of 4.5 percent, if one can believe the statistics; since then the GDR, as well, has had a growth problem. In the longer term, structural adaptation will not be enough to support the business boom. For the first time last year, the target figures could not be met; the growth rate declined to 4 percent.

The possibilities for continued industrial modernization are limited. An obstacle to "unity of economic and social politics" (Honecker's slogan) is also the persistence of a huge pent-up demand in the housing market. Even many of the homes built in the postwar era must already be replaced. About 10 percent of the national income is spent on the construction of housing and on rent subsidies. Additional funds, which would benefit industry in its plans for expansion, go for other subsidies: food, streetcars, heating, and electricity are very inexpensive for the GDR citizens.

Independent artisans, particularly bakers and butchers, point out that fixed low prices leave them no leeway for improving the quality of their products. Rents of between 80 and 100 Marks for a 3-room apartment make it impossible to renovate, and hence maintain the substance of privately owned homes. The houses are dilapidating. Nick admits that the low costs of electricity of 8 Pfennings per kilowatt-hour are hardly an incentive for private households to save energy. This has led to new thinking. "We do not consider our price structure to be an obligatory system we are bound to keep forever."

Nick is frank enough to admit that the development of the GDR is not only hampered by outside challenges, but also by homemade problems. In his words, "The most important sources of our social progress are also our problems." The GDR leaders harbored illusions about the people's willingness to perform. Experience has shown that social security "is not necessarily an incentive to work hard." Nick continues, "We have an inefficiency that would be impossible under capitalism." Material incentives are supposed to change that: "The individual must be made to feel it in material terms. Today, companies often fail to exhaust all existing possibilities," the economics professor laments.

Laying workers off can hardly be reconciled with the idea of the socialist community. This doctrine continues to exist in the GDR—unlike in, for instance, Hungary and, more recently, the USSR. Nevertheless, the wage system does provide effective ways for disciplining workers. In the "Fritz Heckert" Combine, which counts Volkswagen among its good customers, the last inspector must sign off by name. Should any deficiencies develop later on, those responsible may expect reductions in their pay. This is used again and again. Karlheinz Arnold, first deputy of the director general, believes this is justified, "We all depend on quality." In addition, lists with some 30 categories are publicly posted on a monthly basis that

report the status of the individual's performance. This also includes a category on order at the workplace. Only those who meet their targets can expect a 13th monthly wage payment as a bonus.

Some aspects of those systems have existed in all GDR enterprises for a long time. However, nonmaterial work incentives like those in Western companies can only be found in model plants, such as in the "Planeta" Printing Machine Plant in Radebeul near Dresden, which has been successful in international markets and hence has some experiences with the West. With 2-digit growth rates, "Planeta" has earned about 60 percent of its sales from exports to the West and measures its achievements against well known competitors in the FRG. Frank Junker, director of technology and rationalization, notes, "We are trying to show what can be accomplished with working for the quality of life."

The first impression of the enterprise in the Karl-Marx city of Radebeul is already unusual. Only recently, "Planeta" has moved into a new, dove-blue administration building, the interior of which—designed by an interior designer in the Memphis style—would look good in Western architecture magazines. For the above target foreign exchange earnings, the firm has purchased modern medical equipment for the company-owned dispensary. The plant is renovating entire streets in the historic construction style and has plans to build a vacation home for its employees in the Interhotel style. In their work, project managers are success oriented and have a chance to get performance bonuses. Junker believes that this will increase the "pressure to be successful." "Eventually, that becomes fun." But he is worried about the state planning boards. "It is absolutely possible to work within the framework established by law. Our problem is the mediocrity of middle management. Not objective problems, but subjective things are complicating life for us."

Then Junker discusses a topic that is of concern to every manager in the GDR—the COCOM list. The GDR is hard hit by these embargo regulations because the country has developed a huge gap in terms of modern technologies. Like Junker, many people argue, "We are going to go the way of automation, nobody will prevent us from doing so. We have to prove our pride and capabilities in areas where embargo regulations exist."

Nonetheless, partly cut off from the West, the GDR economy lacks partners for high-tech cooperation. Prof Siegfried Schiller, deputy director of the Manfred-von-Ardenne Research Institute in Dresden, says, "Between the GDR and Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia, there is a technological difference. The USSR as well, our most important partner, has problems that are very different from ours."

This is why GDR enterprises hope for the across-border transfer of know-how and licensing with the FRG. However, there is no mention as yet of joint ventures; GDR

economists, in their lack of experience, are afraid to be outfoxed by Western companies. According to information from leading economic strategists, the GDR observes the same developments in its brother countries and waits for their success or failure.

The GDR economists are very well aware of the fact that the way into the future will be very difficult. Professor Nick believes, "We can live with a gap, but not with a growing discrepancy." This, in the long term, is a matter of survival, "A gap—that used to mean, that we had fewer things. Today, in view of the fast technological developments, it means that we no longer have specific things."

Daily Cites Kombinat, Ministers for Consumer Goods Shortage
23000032 East Berlin *BERLINER ZEITUNG*
in German 24 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Dieter Resch: "By October: Additional Goods for 100 Million—Contract Shortages of 39 Million Marks—Needed: More Attention to Quality, Meeting Needs, and Renovation"]

[Text] [Boxed item: Producing and marketing more consumer goods for which the demand is great is, as is well known, a social and economic necessity of the highest order. That is also true of industry in (East) Berlin, which has increased its output in this area markedly. For 1988, consumer goods for the domestic market valued at 8.3 billion marks (wholesale) are being produced. That is twice as much as 1980. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences among industrial plants in Berlin. That is particularly the case when it comes to meeting trade quotas and goals. We went out in search of current facts, conditions, and problems.]

The situation at the beginning of October: Consumer goods valued at 6.1 billion marks were produced in Berlin in the 9 months of this year. That was 100.6 million marks above the plan's goal, and it represented an increase of more than 6 percent over the previous year. This result is above the average of the GDR.

Four-fifths of all plants have met both their quotas as well as their competitive obligations thus far. Hence the goal expressed by the motto "Course GDR 40: More consumer goods from Berlin," namely, to produce goods valued at 140 million marks more than was projected.

No Show With Cosmetic Prices

Approximately 30 plants have quota contract shortages when compared with the required trade. These goods consist of goods valued at 39 million marks that were not delivered at all, not delivered in timely fashion, or goods that do not conform to the specifications agreed to in the contract.

Clear-cut progress has been made, particularly in the area of technical consumer goods, in which Berlin has been able to increase its production two and a half fold. Great efforts have been made this year. The results of these efforts are shown by the following results from these plants:

- The Peoples' Electro and Plant Construction Project produced 1,800 air filter hoods over and above the quota.
- The Peoples' Bergmann-Borsig plant produced more than an additional 1,000 electric razors over and above the quota.
- The Rationalization Kombinat provided an additional 645 Crossi children's bicycles.
- The television electronics plant surpassed its quota of color picture tubes by almost 17,000 units.
- The cosmetics Kombinat produced an excess of decorative cosmetics valued at 5 million marks.

The annual consumer goods production comparisons that take place in Berlin have had a pronounced effect upon the pace of production and the quality. This year's comparison demonstrated: This was no show at which cosmetic prices were listed. Critical measurements were taken. Need is the point of departure in the meetings that take place at the SED district director's office with the directors of the kombinats and plants, but also with trade leaders, the ASMW, and the Norming Office.

One of the most important findings was that the role played by the 11 kombinats overseeing the means of production in producing better quality consumer goods has increased this year to 8.1 percent of the goods they produced (as opposed to 7.4 per cent in 1987). That is the average.

It is true that some kombinats are not yet meeting their quotas. Whereas the "7th of October" machine toolmakers have made a good start producing sunroof windows for passenger cars and have a good plan for marine motors to be constructed beginning in 1989, there is a shortfall in the construction of rolling stock for railroads. More initiative is needed for new developments in large-scale production (work has been going on for years on an accu-operated electric razor), and in the KWO kombinat, particularly in the area of lawn edgers. In general, the technical level of consumer goods from these kombinats, when measured against their great potential for research and development, is not high enough.

Among those operations that are now successful, one finds the People's Star Radio Berlin. A few days ago, the 400,000th stereo recorder produced there rolled off the assembly line. This plant has made great strides in the last 3 years: In 1986, 94,166 stereo recorders were produced; in 1987, 160,860; and this year 204,000 of the popular models SKR 700/701 will be produced.

It is not the fault of the workers at the People's Star Radio Berlin if one of the most important consumer goods production goals set for the capital—the greatest rates of increase in stereo recorders—is not reached. The leadership of the kombinat for electronics equipment plants, (the EAW), must bear the brunt of the blame. As early as the Best Worker Conference in mid-September, the bitter lesson was learned that carelessness on the part of the leadership of the EAW led to delays and substandard production in the case of the "Audio 145" recorder.

Is the Lesson Learned Worth It in the Case of Furniture?

A lesson of this kind had to be learned by the People's Refrigeration Plant in the case of the three temperature zone refrigerator, by the furniture kombinat in the case of its new models, and by other plants. In the case of the furniture kombinat, logical measures taken in management's activities have meant that quotas have been met since September. Further attention, and more of it, must be paid to quality. Every third product of the People's Indoor Furniture Kombinat in the last 8 months had a complaint filed against it by the purchaser—a figure that is at once a shame and, from an economical standpoint, indefensible.

Eliminating quota contract shortages is a priority of the first magnitude. A few examples (pointed out to us by the Berlin quota contract court) that have a negative effect on supplies, include:

Necessary Decisions at the Ministerial Level

By the end of August, the outer clothing kombinat had shortages in terms of wholesale or trade with the Central Stores of thousands of pairs of trousers, jackets or blouses and dresses; outboard motors from the Peoples' Carburetor and Filter Plant, shoes from the Peoples' Goldpunkt Plant, grinding compounds from the Peoples' Grinding Compound Plant, and balcony laundry drying racks from the Berlin Metalworks and Semi-Finished Goods Plant, all-purpose and photographic lamps from BGW, rerecording adapters from the Radio Plant, and toys from TT Trains were altogether unavailable.

The reasons for shortages in shipments vary. Problems in procurement play a particularly significant role, as does faulty decisionmaking, or delays in decisionmaking, both at the ministerial level and at the level of plant management.

Thus, the shortages from the Berlin outer clothing kombinat was basically the result of missing shipments from textile mills. In this instance, decisions called for long ago by the kombinat were not made by the Ministry of Light Industry, and they have not been made to this day. The Peoples' Electromechanics Plant in Kaulsdorf was unable to supply thousands of coffee machines and kitchen trash compactors. In addition to their own shortages in terms of toolmaking, the lack of sufficient

capacity to develop has a negative impact on suppliers. As a result, more than 60,000 heating systems that the Peoples' Praecitronic Plant in Dresden was supposed to deliver, are not there.

These examples in themselves show what the planning meetings for 1989 show in part: The State Planning Commission, the Industrial Ministries, and the Directors General of the combines should take greater care to assure that projected production figures, material balances, investment decisions, and rationalization measures all jibe with one another. They must be guided by the economic demands made of the ultimate producer, but they must also take the supplying industries into account. Only in this way can concrete product-oriented rates of increase be planned and realistically achieved.

In every industrial plant in Berlin it is necessary to consolidate the plant's own assets together with those of its cooperative partners to the end that planning goals and trading obligations are met.

That is also the case for meeting additional obligations. What is meant in this regard in a word, are industries such as the metalworks and semifinished goods industries in the production of Venetian blinds, the Peoples' Furniture Factory in the production of its "Regatta" model, TT Tracks in the production of cars and other motor vehicles, PGH Television and Radio in the case of amplifiers, the Peoples' Interior Lighting Plant, and other plants that have not as yet produced any consumer goods in excess of their quotas, although it has been reported that promising deals have been concluded.

BZ Discussion: What Helps, What Hinders

Projections regarding the management and planning of consumer goods production deserve as much attention as current production does. In 1990, it is projected that approximately 11 billion marks' worth of consumer goods will be produced in Berlin. That is a very high goal! Such a goal requires research and development today for new consumer goods, and to set up the technology required to produce such high numbers of units. The rationalization necessary in many plants must play an important part in this process, just as increased use of robots and computers must, in order to achieve the more economical production of higher numbers of units, and to increase quality control as well.

The BERLINER ZEITUNG would like to take a supporting stance when it comes to adhering to quota and contractual goals, for quantitative and qualitative improvements in the production of consumer goods. For this reason, we urge open discussion of these topics. We invite the various Ministers, Directors General, Plant Directors, and Workers' Collectives to voice their opinions about how the problems outlined here (but other ones as well) might be solved, about how progress can be made, about what helps, and what hinders. What is at

issue here is meeting a need that we all have—being able to buy industrial goods that we need, ones that we like, ones that are useful, and confirm again and again: Good work is worthwhile.

Geological Conditions Surveyed for Potential Geothermal Use

23000020 East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 5, Jul 88 (signed to press Jul 88) pp 261-263

[Article by Eng O. Schaffrath: "Using Geothermal Sources for Heating Purposes—A Contribution to Energy Economy"]

[Text] It is of fundamental significance to the further steady and dynamic growth of the economy to explore and use our own raw material resources and to refine all available energy sources, raw materials, and materials to a high level.¹

This national economic task among other things requires us—with the help of science and technology—to guarantee the growing energy requirements due to efficient energy use, distribution, and conversion, as well as to noticeably reduce the specific energy consumption.

According to estimates from the year 1982, the GDR will have solid fuels available for approximately another 40 years.²

Although nuclear energy and natural gas will be used in the future and although the energy industry will be using other alternative possibilities, which will help us extend this period of useful employment, there is a need within the national economy to keep more and more crude lignite—the only carbon source on the territory of the GDR—available for substance conversion processes. At this time, about 40 percent of the primary energy yield in the GDR is being spent on space heating. The energy requirement for heating purposes thus constitutes the biggest consumer group.

Primary energy is being used efficiently if one can obtain as much energy as possible from it in a form that can be mutually converted (mechanical energy into electrical energy and the other way around). Saving energy in particular means saving heat. It is, however, not just for reasons of savings but rather because of the requirement for looking for new, practical scientific-technical and technological solutions that we justify the need for consistently exploiting the possibilities of geothermal sources and of the more efficient use of energy byproduct yields and environmental energy. As part of an effort aimed at reducing primary energy consumption for space heating, we find that solutions, which involve the use of renewable energy, are assuming increasing significance. One possibility is to make use of geothermal resources.

As a result of the large-scale technical experiment in Waren-Papenberg, it was possible to prove that the existing geothermal resources could be employed for heating purposes. From the energy and economic viewpoints, it is necessary to install new types of heating systems—low-temperature heating systems. Parallel to this, it is necessary to introduce new heating equipment, to improve the physical construction-engineering properties of the buildings, because the energy flow over the building envelope, as a nonregenerable heat loss flow, must be replaced by an equivalent heat output.

The use of low-temperature heat from geothermal sources, as well as energy byproduct and environmental energy will lead to a decisive primary energy saving and to a noticeable relief for the environment. This is why, for the sake of attaining a high degree of energy economy, geothermal sources for heating military facilities in the northern area of the GDR will assume increasing significance during the coming long-term periods. The use of this energy source however requires a higher reconstruction expenditure. This is why reconstructions of heating systems should in a practical fashion be combined with other construction measures in the context of military building construction support.

1. What is Geothermal Energy?

The grounds represent a natural heat storage facility. Up to a depth of 15-20 meters, seasonal fluctuations of the air temperature do influence the ground temperature. (The terrestrial heat flow can be neglected in this depth range.) Below this depth level, the temperature rises continually as we go deeper. The temperature gradient (change of earth temperature with the depth) depends on the geological conditions and varies in different regions. The lower temperature limit for geothermal heat use was set at 20° C, that is to say, boreholes must be pushed deeper than 500 meters.

As far as we know today, only up to 20 percent of the observed heat flow result from heat originating in the interior of the earth. The largest part originates during the radioactive decay of certain elements in the earth's crust, such as, for example, Uranium-235 and 238, Thorium-232, and Potassium-40.³

Geothermal energy is the heat in the underground that springs from internal sources in the earth. Thermal water, water-steam mixture, water vapor, pressurized water, or hot dry rock can be used as energy sources.

So far, hot water and steam in volcanic regions (for example, on Kamchatka and Iceland) have been used for the most part; on the other hand, low-thermal water, with temperatures between 50 and 100° C are assuming increasing significance in the national economy at this time. This kind of water is available worldwide and offers many different utilization possibilities for residential, social, and industrial buildings.

2. Geological Conditions in the GDR

The territory of the GDR can be subdivided into two major areas in geological terms (Figure 1).

In the northern part of the GDR, there are thick plateau-overthrust mountains, which reveal little in the way of structural subdivision. The sediment cover layer—in which the salt cushions, domes, and walls are embedded—attains a thickness of up to 5 km. These intercalations influence the temperature and the heat flow field locally.

The thick sandy-clayey-carbonated sedimentary rocks store large quantities of thermal water with low enthalpy (heat content).

The southern part of the GDR is characterized by a pronounced block faulting pattern. The crystalline bedrock, which in part crops out in large areas, is superposed in the depressions by relatively thin sedimentary layers (maximum thickness 1.5 km). The southern part consists essentially of impermeable crystalline bedrock.

Pronounced geothermal anomalies are not found in the territory of the GDR (Figure 2).⁶ Accordingly, we can also record only a normal to slightly increased temperature-depth distribution ($T(z)$). Comparing the $T(z)$ values in the northern part to those of the southern part of the GDR, it is interesting to note that the sediments in the northern part, compared to the rocks in the southern part, are somewhat hotter at comparable depths. The differences amount to 3.5 K at 500 meters, 4.4 K at 1,000 meters, 12.7 K at 1,500 meters, and 13.3 K at 2,000 meters.

In the northern part of the GDR, we can figure on larger deposits of low-thermal ground water because of the predominant geological structure, whereas in the southern part, it would be possible to use hot dry rocks (hot-dry-rock method) on account of the crystalline bedrock.

3. Possibilities for Using Geothermal Sources

3.1. Low-Thermal Waters from Geothermal Aquifers

Permeable water storage horizons were explored in the GDR north of the line Magdeburg—Berlin—Cottbus which contain extractable ground water. The porous and highly permeable water-containing layers, which are spread over large surfaces, are located both at depths between 1,000 and 1,500 meters (temperatures 40-55°C), and from 1,500 to 2,000 meters (temperatures of 55-80°C).

Geothermal energy is a local form of energy. It is necessary to decide at each site which aquifers can be used economically.

The entire Mesozoic overthrust mountains contain ground water. These ground waters are not artesian and must be taken out by means of pumps. The ground waters reveal a high content of minerals (mineralization). The salt content (NaCl) is close to the boundary value. It is 50-350 g/lit. The concentration increases with the depth. Mineralization and the geological conditions force us to make sure that:

- corresponding corrosion protection will be guaranteed and that corrosion-proof materials will be used in the below-ground and above-ground installation of geothermal heating plants;
- the water—after using its heat energy content—must again be forced into the storage horizons in order to prevent environmental damage;
- the mineralized geothermal water from the storage area horizons can be used only via a double-drilling system (extraction and reinjection probe).

To prevent a thermal and hydraulic short-circuit, there has to be an interval between both boreholes. A figure of 1,000-2,000 meters is given in (5).

In designing the below-ground system, we must start with the idea that both the thermal conditions and the technical-technological solutions should permit a utilization time of up to 30 years. Overall, the geothermal energy potential of the GDR can then be categorized as a regenerable energy source. The storage deposits are practically inexhaustible but can be used only to a moderate extent.


Under our territorial conditions and according to the state of technology, geothermal energy can be used in the immediate future only in the form of low-thermal water in the North.


3.2. Obtaining Heat From Low-Lying Hot Dry Rock

The description of the geological conditions makes it clear that, in the South of the GDR—where sufficient impermeable deep-seated rock is available in the widespread bedrock mountains—the hot-dry-rock method can be used for geothermal energy extraction at depths of 2,500-4,000 meters.

The decisive factor regarding the effectiveness of this extraction method is that—after the injection drillings have been finished—a sufficiently large heat transfer surface is created above it with the help of the so-called hydraulic-fracturing effect.

The method has not yet been brought to technical maturity. Large-scale industrial experiments are currently being conducted, among other things, in the United States and in the FRG. Numerous technological problems remain yet to be solved for the sake of economical utilization. This includes efforts to find methods by means of which suitable large-surface systems for





heat exchange can be located and created, and which will make it possible in advance to determine the long-term behavior of heat exchange between the circulating water and the rock.

Because the hot-dry-rock technology is not yet ready for series production and because it requires huge investments on account of the required deep-drilling operations, we can say that this method is currently only of prognostic significance for the southern part of the GDR.

4. Status of Geothermal Energy Utilization

From the status of science and technology involved in the use of geothermal energy in the GDR, we can derive a statement to the effect that this local environmental energy will become a constantly growing part of the long-term energy balance. After the Neubrandenburg Geothermal VEB became operational, we had the prerequisites for using geothermal energy in support of large-scale industrial use with equipment from our own industry.

A geothermal heating plant was erected as a prototype plant at the Waren-Papenberg site. In its final version, it is to be able to heat almost 1,000 apartments, corresponding to a heating output of 5.12 megawatts. Experimental operation began the 1984-85 heating season and the connected users were and are being supplied with the proper quality and without interruption.

The geothermal heating plant in Waren-Papenberg consists of a below-ground and an above-ground part (Figure 3).⁵ The below-ground part includes the probes with the probe installation and the underwater extraction pump. The above-ground plant part consists of the extrusion pumps with the connecting pipelines of the thermal water cycle, the heat transfer units, pumps, and storage units, the circulating pumps, the peak-load and damage supply system, as well as the safety devices and the measurement, control, and regulating equipment divisions.

The temperature of the thermal water at the output of the extraction probe (50-80° C) and the volume of expenditures that will have to be made for the reconstruction of the buildings and their heating systems, decisively influence the economy of the engineering solution. Starting with the specific conditions, it is necessary to convert the existing heating facilities to low-temperature heating plants. This also applies to all heating systems existing in military facilities.

Looking at the heating systems, we find that water heating systems with operating temperature ranges of 90/70° C and 110/70° C predominate. The heating systems are installed in the form of two-tube and also perpendicular single-tube systems. For the heating surfaces, cast-iron unit radiators but also steel radiators and plate radiators are used for the most part. To achieve energy-economizing effects, it is necessary to examine very accurately where and what kind of efforts are required in the reconstruction of existing systems.

If precisely designed and well-working systems are to be converted to low-temperature heat, then it is indispensable to increase the heating surfaces. The additional expenditure for retrofitting can be kept within tolerable limits in that additional heat insulation measures are taken along the building envelope and in that existing heating surface reserves (overdimensioned space heaters) are included.

In many of the buildings examined, it was confirmed that the heating surface reserves are on the order of magnitude of 10 and 90 percent. Such reserves essentially influence the reconstruction solution and thus also the attendant costs.

In case of overage systems, whose entire pipeline network and heating surfaces are worn out, or whenever, due to incrustations and deposits, fundamental functional shortcomings exist, it is necessary for the most part to carry out a complete new installation. In a similar

manner, we can also figure on a greater reconstruction expenditure in the case of single-pipe heating systems because the heaters and the lines have to be exchanged. In all other cases, it is possible to operate the existing systems with low-temperature heat. Here it has turned out to be necessary at the right time exactly to analyze the thermal behavior of the particular building and, along with structural features, also to check out the capacity of the installations installed in them.⁶

Evaluating the thermal performance of buildings with sufficient accuracy is a big problem because there are no empirical figures available on the decrease of the thermal quality over a period of time. But even purely mathematical investigations based on inventory documents would—at least in the case of older buildings and with continually developing internal substance and material burdens (moisture burdens)—yield questionable data.

The infrared-thermographic measurement method in combination with heat flow measurements proved to be effective in the effort to analyze the thermal behavior of buildings in practical terms with sufficient accuracy.


In those places, where geothermal resources are to be used in the future, it is necessary, before any planning is done, to conduct comprehensive surveys and analyses concerning the structural condition of the buildings and the installations as well as regarding the functional and supply safety of the heating systems. This calls for close cooperation between the user, the requester, the investment client, and the planning agencies.

5. Comments on the Economic Aspect

By using geothermal sources for central and noncentral heat supply, it is basically possible to save larger quantities of fossil fuels. The economic values, which are decisive here, such as energy effectiveness, production and operating costs, and investment expenditures, are extensively determined by territorial conditions. As a result of bibliography research (footnotes 7, 8, and 9), we can, among other things, make the following generally applicable statements:

First of all, looking at geothermal energy as a heat source, its economy depends essentially on the extent to which thermal water is used in energy terms. The pressing temperature of the thermal water should be as low as possible. There are two ways to do that.

By using heat pumps, we can cool the thermal water down to about 10° C. To be sure, this method calls for an additional share of electric energy for temperature transformation (up to 25 percent of the usable heat output) plus a considerable investment expenditure. The attainable substitution share for crude lignite is almost 50 percent.



The second possibility consists of using corresponding low-temperature systems (for example, floor heating) in order thus to reduce the return temperature to the maximum extent. The additional effort required for this in terms of building remodelling and for the installation of special heating systems, would lead us to expect pressing temperatures of about 25° C. This means a lesser energy

yield from thermal water than in the case of the first method but it does give us a possible substitution share for crude lignite amounting to almost 80 percent. The additional expenditure in the buildings is counterbalanced by a reduced expenditure for the construction of the geothermal heating plant. The solution however presupposes that sufficient water currents will be available for each probe.

Second, the production and operating costs in case of geothermal resources utilization, compared to those connected with conventional heating plants (with steam generators), are definitely lower all the way. The heat generation costs for geothermal heating plants are only about 70 percent.

Third, however, the specific investment expenditures for geothermal use, on the basis of the high expenditure for extraction, building remodeling, and heating plant, are higher than those required for conventional heating methods. The relationship between the considerably lower production and operating costs, on the one hand, and the additional investment expenditure, on the other hand, gives us tolerable return flow times that justify the additional expenditure.

Depending on the local conditions and the particular method used, one can attain return flow times of up to 15 years.

6. Conclusion

The results deriving from large-scale use, in the Waren-Papenberg area, confirm that it is basically possible to use geothermal underground waters of low enthalpy for heating purposes. The method and the technical solution concept make it possible to use additional domestic energy resources as alternative, to lower the specific consumption of fossil fuels, and to reduce environmental pollution. Because geothermal heating plants can be operated in a fully automated fashion, the fact that workers could be released for employment elsewhere would constitute yet another advantage.

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POLAND

More Economic Safety Noted in Improved CEMA-EEC Relations
26000110a Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
27 Sep 88 p 5

[Article by Maria Wagrowska: "CEMA-EEC-Poland—Better Prospects"]

[Text] Fairly recently, just two to three years ago, the prospects for the establishment of official contacts and efficient cooperation between the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and the European Economic Community did not seem too bright. However, without judging the future of these relations, we can still say that the normalization of relations between these two economic organizations has become a part of the better political relations between the West and East and that a certain "detente" has also been achieved in economics.

Poland has taken her own part in these changes. A few days ago, an announcement was made that official relations with the EEC had been established. Negotiations for an agreement on trade and economic cooperation are continuing.

In relation to the period elapsed since the signing of the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC on 25 March 1958 and created an entirely new economic, legal and political quality factor in international relations, strong revaluations are presently being made. This is above all expressed in the treaty regulations and in the 25 June 1988 signing in Luxembourg of the Joint CEMA-EEC Declaration on the establishment of official mutual relations and the development of cooperation in areas of common interest as well as in the effort to use bilateral agreements to normalize relations between the EEC and individual CEMA states.

It is a matter of enormous political importance that neither CEMA nor EEC has become fixed in the approach it has used so far with a potential partner and that both sides are now ready to reconsider their earlier opposition and compromise. The signing of the declaration was recognized by a communique from the 44th CEMA Session as "the first step in the development of

relations between the two great international economic organizations, one which opens the way to cooperation in areas of interest to both sides".

The very declaration by which CEMA and EEC established official relations does not specify the extent, form or methods of cooperation. Specially designated representatives are supposed to determine that through negotiation. The declaration also states the possibility of creating new areas of cooperation. Actual practice up to now, which has not been changed solely by an act establishing official relations, and analysis of the political statements given as a commentary on the declaration have made it possible to preliminarily determine the extent of any future cooperation (assuming, of course, that European relations will continue to stress detente). Therefore, cooperation could possibly include:

- an exchange of information on planned economic growth and prognosis;
- standardization of norms that could be used to liquidate some obstacles to trade;
- environmental protection, standardization of norms on maximum permissible levels of pollutants, and joint studies on protection of fauna and flora;
- science and technology (for example, participation of CEMA research organizations in the EUREKA program);
- cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy (which to some extent is already being done through the International Atomic Energy Agency) and in electrical energy (for example, in the construction of power lines and in research on alternative energy sources);
- transport, public transportation, and communications;
- growth policy.

The catalog is a rich one but it is only a list of possibilities and the declaration should also be seen from the same point of view. It is an act of great political importance and clearly shows the possibility of an undivided Europe. The declaration may turn out to be a document of considerable importance to European economic relations if it is given real substance. Between CEMA and EEC as well as between the individual member nations, there are some fundamental structural differences and portions of their economic systems that do not adequately allow for trade with other nations. There is the problem of currency exchange and there are complications in the value ratios between national currencies and their relation to the exchange ruble and the dollar. Considering how hard it was to discuss intensification of economic cooperation at the Conference on European Cooperation and Security in Vienna and the creation of

a system of European security, it is also hard to unequivocally evaluate the West's political intentions toward the European socialist states. The future of relations is burdened with the old approach which has often depreciated the other side. The main examples of this are the way that EEC has in many cases discriminated against the CEMA nations (this discrimination being most obvious in EEC's trade relations with other regions) and the fact that the structure of bilateral trade has not been appropriately changed while at the same time the rate of growth in this trade has declined since the end of the 1970's. According to western sources, the EEC share in total CEMA trade in 1970 was 10.4 percent of the exports in 1970 and 12.0 percent of the imports and in the record year of 1980, the respective figures were 18.6 percent and 15.8 percent. In 1984, EEC was involved in 17.0 percent of CEMA's exports and 12.0 percent of the import trade. On the other hand, CEMA involvement in total EEC trade was 4.3 percent of the exports and 3.1 percent of the imports in 1970, 3.4 percent and 3.6 percent in 1980 and 2.8 percent and 4.4 percent in 1984. Most of this trade involves CEMA export to EEC of energy, raw materials, unfinished products and food or agricultural products and EEC export to CEMA of machinery, equipment and investment items.

For many different reasons, the Declaration to establish relations between CEMA and EEC and the subsequent negotiations for agreements between the individual nations of both groups can signify a turning point in relations. This process, regardless of political relations between the East and West, will depend on two basic factors.

The first of these is policy on trade and economic cooperation between the EEC and the outside world after 1992, in other words, after the planned creation of an integrated internal market. All of EEC's trade partners including the CEMA states are already asking whether the liberalization of the flow of people, services, goods and capital within the "twelve" will be accompanied by liberalization of foreign relations and whether the process of "openness" to the CEMA nations will be continued.

At the same time, what now most interests the EEC nations is the future of the political and economic reconstruction initiated in the socialist countries as a phenomenon that creates an opportunity for economic growth and promises a new approach to European problems.

The very establishment of official relations was associated with the revaluation by our nations of their position toward the EEC. In the middle of June 1985, the CEMA nations offered the EEC their latest proposal for negotiations which this time were to be started on the basis of new principles. For the first time, it was stated that CEMA did not want to conclude a "framework treaty" for trade between the two groups. Negotiations between individual CEMA and EEC nations were accepted. The

EEC opposed the establishment of any large-scale positions, arguing that CEMA is not empowered to direct the trade policy of its member states.

Trade and economic cooperation is therefore supposed to be regulated by bilateral agreements and the change in EEC's approach is also worth noting. On 25 July 1988, the EEC Council dropped its earlier position that only business agreements could be made with CEMA nations and accepted the possibility of negotiating so-called broad agreements allowing economic cooperation.

In June of last year, these principles were also included in a Polish plan for trade and economic cooperation with EEC. A few days prior to that, there concluded the fourth round of negotiations over the extent of the mandate for which the EEC commission was to appeal to the EEC Council of Ministers as the supreme charter organ. The Polish plan called for legal guarantees of the most favored nation trade status, establishment of a calendar for suspension of trade quotas, repeal of restrictions to the import of Polish agricultural products, industrial cooperation (including direct plant-to-plant cooperation and joint ventures) and an exchange of information and experts.

With regard to the continuing negotiations, it is hard to say how much the Polish proposals will be reflected in the final text of the agreement. We do know that EEC is categorically opposed to the agreement including provisions on financial and credit regulation and has emphasized that it will be impossible to negotiate an agreement as broad as that reached by Hungary (which is regarded as a country with a market economy).

However, the efforts to base relations with EEC not only on business contacts but also on economic cooperation should foster more extensive development of economic ties to the West and help increase Poland's economic security.

Amendments Still Not Conducive to Foreign Capital Investments
26000112a Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
13 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Plesinski: "Foreign Capital in Poland: Whole or Half Step?"]

[Text] In the circumstances in which our economy currently finds itself, given the failure of most actions related to the implementation of the second stage of economic reform and the intensification of economic difficulties, one hears more and more often—from the highest groups in our country too—that Poland must be linked more closely than ever before to the world economy. Because of the need to pay off foreign debt and because of urgent capital needs and the need for at least a partial change in the manufacturing structure and finally because of our efforts for broader participation in the international division of work.

But how does this problem look in practice? For more than ten years foreign small-scale manufacturing enterprises, e.g., so-called Polonia firms, have been operating here, and rules allowing the establishment of foreign capital partnerships in our country have been in effect for two years. Several of these economic entities have already begun to operate efficiently. But is this enough to say that we are "opening up to the world," if only to a minimally satisfying degree. With current laws, with the generally conservative mentality of the apparatus governing the economy, with minimal receptivity to changes in our economic system, can we expect more significant results? Can we reckon that in a relatively short time we will attract foreign investors who, with benefits for themselves and Poland, would want to set up modern production that would be competitive in the world? And finally—in the event of a favorable beginning to initiatives of this kind—can we hope that the principles of economic efficiency and the demands of modernness characteristic of foreign capital investment partnership will, after a certain time, be grafted onto "traditional" areas of Polish production? Such as mining, metallurgy and shipbuilding.

Lack of Decisiveness

It would seem that statements on mutual relations between the spheres of economics and politics would be absolutely clear. But today in public statements we are going back to truths long unnoticed. In connection with this, should we also expect that when it comes to capital cooperation with foreign countries, we will abandon the extraeconomic, dogmatic arguments that have hindered it thus far?

The currently drafted amendment to the law "on economic activity with participation by foreign entities" coincides with work on the formulation of still other legal regulations from which rather significant changes in management methods in our country are expected. The point here is mainly regulations dealing with freedom to undertake economic activity, establishing the circulation of securities and demonopolization in the fields of production, supply and markets. Without getting into detailed considerations of these extremely important solutions here, I can say only that as in the case of the law on foreign capital partnerships, when it comes to the remaining rules, one cannot see decisiveness appropriate to the country's present economic situation. This means—at least one might get this impression—that there is still a lack of awareness of the seriousness of the crisis and difficulties in which we have found ourselves, that there is a lack of will to forecast truly profound changes that as a consequence could lead to reforms of a structural, systemic nature.

To a certain degree—despite a number of favorable modifications—this opinion also applied to the bill for the current amendment to the law on foreign capital investment partnerships of 1986. And this conviction turns up not only among potential investors but also in

circles that participate only indirectly in establishing capital cooperation with foreign countries—such as, for example, the Polonia Society, the Sejm Socioeconomic Council, or among independent experts. In this last case, the statement of Professor Jozef Kaleta during a recent meeting of the Extraordinary Commission in the Sejm is symptomatic; the statement was made that on certain points the current amendment bill constitutes regression in relation to previous solutions.

In a word, one should at least avoid mistakes already made—such as the need to make changes after laws have been in effect for barely two years because previously, in 1986, there was a certain lack of courage and imagination in formulating the conditions under which foreign capital would operate in our country. Today this situation can no longer be repeated. For it is necessary to remember that legal regulation of the rules for activity by foreign investors in Poland is merely a beginning and that above all, it is necessary to convince foreign countries of the stability of our solutions and politics. So can we reach this goal if inhibitions or the arguments of various pressure groups, most often conservative, continue to predominate in our thinking about the economy?

What Changes?

The currently drafted amendment carries a good number of favorable changes. Mainly in the financial and tax area, on the issue of the size of the investment and enterprise management, it allows present "Polonia firms" to transfer to the status of foreign investment partnerships (even in the form of a one-person partnership, which is an exceptionally important novelty!), and it simplifies certain procedures for carrying out supervision of the activity of foreign investors. So there is some progress in relation to previous solutions, and that is that this legal instrument enjoys great approval and is eagerly awaited. Except that the bill sent to the Sejm still has rather gross faults without whose removal all other positive decisions may be subject to thorough impairment and along with it the appeal of the entire law.

One of the bill's shortcomings that will surely be very painfully felt by already existing and newly emerging foreign investment partnerships is the issue of obtaining permits to establish an enterprise and licenses to conduct the specified activity. The procedure adopted in the bill seems to duplicate itself, since a permit is not synonymous with a license. It is understandable that there are certain fields (i.e., defense) where limits are necessary in the conduct of economic activity by foreign individuals. So would it not be sufficient to introduce specific provisions dealing with these sensitive areas? Would a permit not be sufficient in the case of changes and additions to the scope of activities? Why increase the circulation of paperwork and force investors not accustomed to this to overcome bureaucratic obstacles?

Another exceptionally important matter is the arbitrariness of decisions of the government plenipotentiary for

foreign investment affairs provided in the bill. The decisions of this official are not to be subject to any kind of appeal nor must they be justified. And this applies to the most important issue, e.g., the granting of permits. So this solution is not only contrary to the spirit of reform and the democratization of political, social and economic life, but also to the customs accepted for centuries in the world. Can we encourage, for example, an American businessman in this way, placing his fate in the hands of even the best and most straightforward official, but an official nonetheless.

And a related problem: The bill does not provide for a gradation of penalties against those who violate entrepreneurs' laws. One can only liquidate the partnership or limits its permit. Yet everywhere there are people working who supposedly have a right to make mistakes. Why punish an investor for mistakes made by the partnership's employees, for instance? Instead of liquidation, why not impose a fine, for example, that would help the treasury instead of taking away all receipts, including those from taxes?

In other parts of this documents one can unfortunately find other manifestations of the bureaucratic way of thinking. This concerns mainly the issue of the requirement for all foreign investment enterprises to organize. Is this too not contrary to reform and democratization? Have we not have enough experience in this regard? (Incidentally, the most resistance to suspending the obligation to organize comes from those who have always demanded loosening of controls and democratization of economic decisions; hence unions of craftsmen and cooperative members, among others). The same is true for means of granting credit for economic activity and rules regulating hard currency turnover. For is one can still justify the need to obtain hard currency permits to incur investment loans, then indeed it seems to be a misunderstanding to stipulate such requirements for so-called merchants' loans. In other words, those that permit efficient and profitable conduct of economic activity and trade. Who is harmed if a partnership, solely on the basis of a telephone conversation, quickly brings in material in short supply from a trusted supplier on credit?

Profits and Guarantees

Finally, the means of exploiting eventual profits by the investors and guarantees for capital invested in Poland. If the issue of use of part of hard currency profit by a foreign partner is well regulated, then there is a lack of regulations in the law regarding the zloty portion of income earned by him. Absolutely nothing is said on how the Polish investors can dispose of their income—both in zloty and hard currency. So if no modestly attractive alternative is proposed, this may bear fruit, as a result, in a lack of interest in investing in partnerships on the part of Polish partners. In the matter of guarantees, the law's contents are at best restrained. The minister of finance may—but need not—grant interested parties, at their request, guarantees of compensation in

the event of nationalization or expropriation. In addition, the rules adopted in the bill significantly hinder investors from demonstrating the property they own to foreign lenders. Yet we know that the basis of Western credit systems is confidence in the borrower and his assets, especially fixed assets.

So why could real property acquired in Poland not constitute this kind of additional bank guarantee? In order to shut off partnerships controlled by foreign capital from this opportunity, even the appropriate law going back to 1920 has been amended. Acquiring real estate was thus made so difficult that it is practically impossible. Is there really no other method of guaranteeing the inviolability of state interests in this regard? Are we not abandoning too hastily potential buyers of currently deteriorating real estate (old palaces, manor houses, etc.) and unused land? In this way part of the partnerships' profits would be consumed in Poland and, in addition, it might be possible to interest some retired Polonia businessmen in buying a comfortable home in Poland and keep their savings in Polish banks.

Just one more observation of a "technical" nature—if one could describe it that way. Roughly one-third of the text of the law is used to amend other laws. In connection with this, one might fear that after translation into foreign languages, it will be unreadable. Yet we are counting on its promoting itself abroad. It would be sufficient to take a surely uncomplicated step, namely these amending rules should be transferred to a simultaneously considered law on amending the trade code. The law on partnerships would gain a great deal in clarity because of this.

Are the suggestions presented here unrealistic? I am convinced they are not. If in other socialist countries there was enough decisiveness to adopt even more far reaching solutions, are we not able to achieve at least something close to it?

Authorities Blamed for Market Disequilibrium, Wage-Price Errors

26000112c Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
14 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview with Prof Jozef Popkiewicz, economist in political economy of socialism, and director, Chair of Social Sciences, [PZPR] Academy of Social Sciences, by Bogdan Mikolajczyk: "Vicious Circle That Needs To Be Broken"; date and place not given]

[Text] Besides looking into the very distant future, consideration of the choice of roads leading to desired forms and solutions on the nearer chronological horizon is necessary. In this context, broad public reflection on delineating a plan for consolidating the national economy for 1989-90 takes on particular significance; the

concept for the plan was formulated at the Eighth Plenum of the party Central Committee and the government should release a specific plan for it before the end of November.

We invite an exchange of opinions in TRYBUNA LUDU that expands the base of public ideas and attitudes and supports work on the preparation of this program.

Mikolajczyk: Professor, there is general agreement that price and income policy thus far has had a most unfavorable impact on our economic situation, that a fundamental turnaround must be made in this policy. I feel this turnaround should be accomplished as soon as possible and that it should be an integral part of the plan for consolidating the national economy for 1989-90 proposed by the Central Committee's Eighth Plenum. If you share this opinion, then on what should this turnaround be based, in your opinion?

Popkiewicz: On reversing current tendencies that eliminate in advance all attempts to capture market equilibrium. In other words, we must decelerate wage increases to the maximum, link wages closely to increases in production and move upward with prices, in the direction of price balance.

Mikolajczyk: With the rate of inflation that already exists?

Popkiewicz: Our price policy—starting with actions carried out by Minister Krasinski—has been disastrous. It has done nothing. It has not brought us closer to equilibrium, nor has it ensured profitability of production. We have found ourselves in a vicious circle, we have limited opportunities for growth on the supply side, caused mainly by a lack of market equilibrium and this equilibrium is lacking because we cannot afford an increase in production that would balance the economy and market.

In my opinion, there is only one way out. This circle can be broken only by a price-income operation as a one-time action or a policy spread out over time that will restore previous proportions in wage-price movement.

Mikolajczyk: We have already endured operations of this kind and nothing good has come of them. Why?

Popkiewicz: Because they were done incorrectly, halfheartedly and inefficiently and, unfortunately, they were compromised in the eyes of the public, since they were either concepts that were not thought out completely or the central authorities, under pressure from public opinion and the trade unions and the opposition, opted for compromise that destroyed price-wage proportions. They condemned the entire effort to failure.

Mikolajczyk: Is this really a government matter?

Popkiewicz: Of course it is! And it will be as long as market equilibrium is not restored. Our center seemed to want to do away with prices. This could not have worked because the government must lead us to market equilibrium and only then can it "free itself" from its direct obligations to the market. Join in the game through other instruments of economic policy.

Prices and wages are the most effective tool for restoring market equilibrium. Even if we manage to increase production fundamentally, we will never achieve market equilibrium through supply alone. Despite previous failures we cannot abandon this basic instrument, although it is very difficult in its application. That which is most unpopular with the public comes into play: limiting the rise of wages and prices. But at bottom, that is all that is left to us.

Mikolajczyk: Public consent to this would be necessary.

Popkiewicz: I believe that expanding dialogue within the framework of understanding, a proreform coalition—about which a great deal has been said lately—could help with public approval to implement a price and income policy. But a policy based on a very consistent concept, not the "muddled" one rightfully attacked for its lack of results.

Mikolajczyk: As I understand it—this would mean agreeing, for a certain amount of time, to belt tightening. But this provokes resistance by a large part of the public and this was expressed by the OPZZ Council at its recent meeting.

Popkiewicz: Very specific "belt tightening" which does not mean a decrease in general consumption but merely a change in its distribution. The negative reception of concepts of this kind arises from the fact that the structure of budgets for household expenditures is characterized by great inertia. This sets up resistance.

It is important to persist for a year, a year and a half—until the first results. Because when we achieve balance, if only in a few segments of the market, this will be an argument that will overshadow fear of high prices. For a selection of items will appear, lines will cease and motivation for savings and increasing income will be revitalized.

Mikolajczyk: But do high prices not call public security into question, especially that of the economically weakest groups? At the meeting of the OPZZ Council, opinions like this were formulated: "Prices for many items of everyday use are so high that working people cannot afford to buy them. Many families no longer have any financial reserves."

Popkiewicz: We have encumbered our current price policy—improperly, in my opinion—with social elements. That is a mistake. The economy and the market should be regulated by their own instruments; then they

will be healthy. Social policy should be regulated by its own instruments too. It has such regulators in the form of directed assistance, among other things.

Mikolajczyk: I notice that of all economic categories, you refer most often to market equilibrium.

Popkiewicz: Because I feel that its lack is the source of all our limitations and problems. I have already mentioned that imbalance in the market is a fundamental hindrance to the growth of supply. And look at quality, which is declining horribly, at productivity and its very problematic growth or at thrift programs which we know are not working. Why? Well, because orders no longer work, but neither do market mechanisms effectively halted by an unbalanced market.

Mikolajczyk: One barrier in production is limited capacities for supplies of materials and raw materials.

Popkiewicz: The unfortunate thing is that what we have is poorly used. Also as a consequence of the production structure not adapted to needs and capabilities.

Mikolajczyk: The government is announcing a more decisive policy aimed at restructuring the economy.

Popkiewicz: Yes, but the market must generate it. Objective criteria for a change of structure can flow only from a balanced market. We talk about restructuring and establish funds for this purpose but we do not know what and how to "restructure." Signals from the market must be received by enterprises. No official from the center can handle this; it can be done only by firms subject to economic constraint emanating from the market.

Mikolajczyk: Let us go back to the other side of the coin—wages. The mechanism for their formulation is faulty; it allows leaks of empty money.

Popkiewicz: If someone could evaluate every job on points (such attempts to value jobs are being made), then we could say: we will pay so much for this point and we could formulate an accurate wage level and structure. But in fact a job cannot be measured this way; there can only be attempts to approximate it. Solutions to this problem must be sought in the labor market.

Mikolajczyk: Allowing for unemployment?

Popkiewicz: I am against the dogma of unemployment and against the dogma of full employment.

Mikolajczyk: Is there a third alternative?

Popkiewicz: There is. Accepting the fact of unemployment if it is the result of a growth in productivity, scientific, technological or organizational progress. And later assuaging this phenomenon (because it is negative), controlling its effects.

Mikolajczyk: How does this relate to the socialist doctrine of full employment?

Popkiewicz: Nothing of the kind will emerge from the doctrine of socialism. We thought up this doctrine ourselves. If full employment is achieved at the expense of lowering the standard of living of the entire society, then what kind of socialism is that? To clarify fully: I am against the arguments for artificially creating unemployment, for setting this as a goal. But if economic constraint begins to work, which will mean that enterprises will have to get going on technological development, lowering costs, productivity. . . .

This economic constraint will turn up in the costs of equilibrium. Because the cost of equilibrium—as the economists say—is the barrier of demand. A simple increase in production is not enough for an enterprise's economic existence. Profit can be increased only through an improvement in efficiency.

Mikolajczyk: So much so that one could thereby wander into a blind alley called "marketing problems."

[Answer] Diora had such problems at one time. But it managed to persuade the Minister of Finance to decrease its income tax and it lowered its prices for radios accordingly. It sold its entire production. The treasury balance did not suffer because of this either.

I note that several years ago I suggested using the income tax as a tool to support market equilibrium. After the first price-wage action I had already thought about introducing price controls and separating from them those groups of articles where balance had been established. Unfortunately, we immediately "forgave" those controls.

Mikolajczyk: Could a similar effort be useful today?

Popkiewicz: I think so. Whether we want to or not, step by step we are undertaking such controls in order to relinquish them when and where there is equilibrium. And going back once again to marketing problems, in my opinion, they are the essence of competition. Where there are no problems there are involuntary monopolies—that is what I call them. We have dozens of candy and confections factories but every one of them is a monopoly because of the lack of market equilibrium. Trade is also an involuntary monopoly. We call for it to negotiate prices in the naive belief that trade will deprive itself of the greater profit associated with margin.

Mikolajczyk: You have presented yourself as an advocate of economic constraint. The public is defending itself against this constraint.

Popkiewicz: It defends itself because there is no one to appeal to from the effects of constraint. The market has

no address, does not react to intervention from the provincial committee, for instance, and one cannot bribe it; it eliminates the weak and rewards only the efficient and industrious.

The public also defends itself, in my opinion, because twice now we have been unable to manage sensible generation and exploitation of economic constraint. So an understanding is necessary that will accept another approach to the price and wage policy, establishing the condition that this time will not wash away anyone's responsibility if, for subjective reasons, the policy proves to be ineffective.

Finally, I would repeat once again: consolidation of forces and resources to increase supply will only bring a temporary result if the price-wage instruments to achieve market equilibrium are not included at the same time. I am thinking also, or perhaps above all, about equilibrium in the producer goods market. This is the foundation for balancing the economy. Without equilibrium in the producer goods market, it will be impossible to maintain balance in the consumer goods market over the long term. Surely there is no need to prove this.

Mikolajczyk: Thank you for the interview.

YUGOSLAVIA

Lack of Firm Energy Program Deplored
28000025 Belgrade *EKONOMSKA POLITIKA*
in Serbo-Croatian 3 Oct 88 pp 24-25

[Article by Dragan Nedeljkovic: "Energy: Neither Program nor Strategy"]

[Text] This fall the discussion will begin again in the SFRY Assembly on the Strategy for Development of Yugoslavia's Fuel and Power Industry up to the Year 2000, including a forecast of development up to the year 2020. Beginning again, because a similar job was initiated exactly a year ago, but it ended ingloriously with the proposed document being sent back for redrafting. What is its fate now? Judging by the first reactions, there is little chance of the Assembly adopting it, since the procedure requires consent of the republics and provinces, and it has already been rejected in the Assembly of SR Croatia because it "proposed nothing new."

One can, of course, understand that it is neither easy nor simple to draw up one of the key documents for the country's development over the next 3 decades, that this requires the involvement of entire teams of specialists, study of the experience of other countries, and verifications using models, but it is difficult to understand why development of coal mines, the petroleum industry, and the electric power industry are being left to spontaneous development and why there is no program nor strategy nor energy policy. This is another thing that makes

Yugoslavia an exception in the world, since there is no other country that is not keeping track of its future as to energy and does not possess at least a "scenario" and the basic proportions of energy development. It is understood in other countries that planning, which at best is examination and prediction of energy development over the next 3-4 decades, is not enough and signifies a short-term commitment in which no essential technical and technological changes will take place, and they have undertaken to draw up programs covering 8 and 10 decades so as to be timely in keeping pace with the anticipated fundamental changes in the production and use of energy.

The situation in the fuel and power industry is not isolated from the general condition of the economy and society, nor can it be so viewed. The specific thing about energy, the factor that argues for special concern about its development, is its sluggishness and inelasticity relative to changes. It is not possible in a few months, or indeed even in a few years, to change the direction of the tide in the production of energy as can be done in most branches of the economy; including the explorations and preparations, it takes at least 10 years or so to build a facility of any significance. And essential technical and technological changes, application of new procedures and processes, and the attainment of rated capacity on new equipment require even longer periods of time.

Chernobyl Was the Trigger

More than 2 years have now passed since the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee and SFRY State Presidency ordered the competent federal agencies to speed up the drafting and adoption of the Program for Development of Yugoslavia's Fuel and Power Industry up to the End of the Century and the Program for Optimization, Substitution, and Conservation of Energy. In the atmosphere of harsh polemics over the building of nuclear power plants and immediately after the accident at Chernobyl, the two presidial bodies demanded that key documents be drafted on the future for energy, arguing that decisions on the new nuclear power plant should not be made without a long-range examination of energy needs and the production potential, above all from domestic sources. One can confidently say that Chernobyl was the trigger for setting to rights the very unfavorable situation in the fuel and power industry. Not only was there no long-range program for development of the fuel and power industry nor an appropriate energy policy, but even the plans of the petroleum industry, the mining industry, and the electric power industry were just pieces of paper that were not fulfilled, and all measure of rationality was lost in the consumption of energy.

Optimality and efficiency in energy use has improved in almost all other countries, while it has deteriorated very rapidly in Yugoslavia. The ratio between the growth of the social product and energy consumption has in most countries been brought down to 1:0.6, and in some even

to 1:0.4, while in Yugoslavia that ratio reached 1:4.96 in the previous 5-year period. Five years earlier the ratio was 1:1.2, and the goal was to come closer to the rest of the world. The very rapid deterioration has occurred without real explanation and indeed even without detailed analyses.

Even without Chernobyl, then, there were enough indicators to prompt action to straighten out the situation in the fuel and power industry. Why have there been no fruits from that action? During these 2 years it has turned out that the warnings from the specialists and the energy associations, which have been issued regularly, not to mention the intervention of the highest bodies of the party and government, have been to no avail. To tell the truth, the Federal Committee for Energy and Industry has gotten down to work, it has drawn up programs for development of the fuel and power industry and for optimization of energy consumption, but in the meantime it has been abolished, and the documents proposed have not been adopted. The way a government body for energy has from time to time been created and then abolished at the federal level over the last 2 decades is a story in itself.

It may seem strange that Yugoslavia has neither an agency nor a document nor a policy for its future as to energy in an age when energy is among the most important preoccupations of the world, when all countries are paying very close attention to supplying their energy needs and to the character of consumption, when large projects such as gas pipelines, the mining and delivery of coal, exploration for and production of petroleum, fission and fusion are becoming international products and are bringing together entire regions and continents.

Especially since there really is not a very great choice as to the basic commitments in the development of energy; they are similar in all countries of the world, and even in our country they were adopted in the Strategy for Long-Range Development of Energy as a part of the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program. That is, two development programs were supposed to be detailed on the basis of that strategy and its principles. It turned out, however, that this in fact was the defect—the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program is rarely mentioned by anyone, and the Strategy for Long-Range Development of Energy has been abandoned without a word. More precisely, the Legislative-Legal Commission of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly suggested to the FEC that the program for development of energy be renamed the Strategy for Development of Energy, since it was a "document of a planning nature adopted on the basis of consensus."

The Second Attempt

In the first attempt, a year ago, the document was not adopted—it was returned to the proponents along with a multitude of suggestions and the categorical rejection of delegates from Slovenia and Croatia. Although it is not

stated anywhere, it seems that the main reason for the inglorious first attempt lay in the fact that the proponents had not in any way changed the commitments contained in the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program. Only the numbers had been changed—the crisis and stagnation had skewed the goals of development, so that the quantities of energy for coming 5-year development plans had become unrealistic. Nor do the other development goals of society, of the economy, and of the social product contained in the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program “fit” any longer, so that those for energy could not either.

However, a clear commitment was retained to abandon voluntarism, administrative direction, and government ownership of the energy economy and to introduce a market system and economic laws, and especially intensified optimal use of energy sources, optimum use of available energy, and reduction of the dependence upon imports. It may seem crude to say that there are many who do not like this, whether it be the republic-provincial “structures” in power or their outlying branches in the management of organizations in the fuel and power industry, but it certainly does seem to be true.

Now comes the second attempt to arrive at the Strategy for Development of the Fuel and Power Industry up to the Year 2000 and a Picture of Development up to the Year 2020. Once again the essential thing is that the entire conception of the strategy be based on the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program, with a further modification of the quantities of energy which the prolongation of the crisis is inevitably bringing about.

Total consumption of primary energy, according to the draft of the strategy that is now in the Assembly, is supposed to grow at an annual rate of 3.66 percent up to the end of the century, and final consumption at a rate of

3.4 percent. The share of imported energy would gradually decline: from 37.7 percent in 1985 to 34.5 percent in 1990 and 32.8 percent at the end of the century. The share of coal would rise to 41 percent toward the end of the century, along with an increase of electric power (21 percent), and a modest growth of new and renewable sources (2.6 percent), while the share of petroleum would decline (25.7 percent). The increased mining of coal, especially to be burned in thermal electric power plants, is replacing only part of the petroleum; a larger part of the substitution is being taken over by natural gas (share 13.2 percent). Nuclear power would have a share of 1.1 percent, since “there is no need” to build new nuclear power plants up to the end of the century, and more detailed analyses need to be made for the period in the new century. There must be an essential increase in the optimality and efficiency of energy use, and an elasticity coefficient of 1:0.82 must be achieved. Reduction of specific energy consumption per unit of the social product is becoming one of the key goals of development—a basic condition for increasing the competitiveness of all products and services on domestic and foreign markets, the proposal states. This approach, it has been calculated, could save about 10 percent of the energy, and that would in turn “facilitate” a savings on construction of new projects in the fuel and power industry.

As for the first 20 years of the next century, we should mention only the basic quantifications in the strategy, i.e., the picture of development: coal, 220 million tons; petroleum, 25 million tons; electric power, 215 billion kwh; coke, 7 million tons; natural gas, 23 billion m³. The approach and commitments are the same, the share of imported energy drops to 25 percent, but the entire package still needs to be studied in detail. Especially as to how all this is to be achieved unless there is a change in the overall inefficiency of the economy.

YUGOSLAVIA

Low Slovene Birthrate Prompts Concern
28000013 Ljubljana TELEKS in Slovene
22 Sep 88 pp 6-9

[Article by Borut Contala: "The Future Grows Short"; first paragraph is TELEKS introduction]

[Text] Will we Slovenes simply die out, since too few of us are being born? Every year the birthrate is declining: circumstances which make it practically impossible for young people to become part of the reproductive process, the aging of the populace, the crisis of worldwide dimensions which offers growing threats to existence in our land, and, finally, the simple mathematical facts say this is true. Specialists think that the birthrate is less dependent on mathematics than anything else, and the effects of the crisis are also uncertain. They say that there have been no examples where a people simply died out biologically, and that the possibilities for existence would be better sought in the world of tomorrow than in population statistics. Despite that, they are worried.

Postwar statistical data vary for individual years, but as a whole they show a lasting trend toward a declining birthrate. Actually, with the exception of some years, in which the birthrate was high by Slovenian standards, there has been an almost uninterrupted decline, which at every point showed a downturn in the demographic curve. The whole period can be divided by two factors.

"Within the overall postwar period some sort of demarkation has to be drawn," says Dr Janez Malacic of the Economic Faculty in Ljubljana. "The first part of that period, until about 1960, is a component part of the overall historical period of democratic development, which we label with the specialized term 'the democratic transition'—a transition from a high birthrate to a low one, transition from an uncontrolled, natural birthrate to a controlled birthrate. That year is somehow characterized as a time when people had as many children 'as God gave them,' and after it came the beginning of measures by which people consciously decided on the number of children they would have. This should be said with some reservations, for people will never consciously decide 100 percent on the number of children. That first period indicates a time of a decreasing birthrate from about 40 per thousand since the end of the 19th century (40 live births per 1,000 population), to a low level, which has been noted for roughly the last 30 years."

The relatively high number of live births in some years of the "demographic transition" was aided by the supplementary "make-up period"; specifically, in the early 1950's a high number of children were born who might have been born earlier had it not been for the turmoil of the world war. The year 1950, with nearly 36,000 children born, represents an absolute postwar record, while the lower numbers of the following years herald a totally new period.

Barely Foreseeable Consequences

The demographic specialists also did not expect such a fundamental and complete change and even today cannot explain precisely just what happened, although something happened that is characteristic in a large part of the modern (developed) world.

"After 1960 the period of high birthrates definitely came to an end," says Dr Malacic. "A different type of birthrate began, which we regard as the modern trend in human reproduction. Its basic feature is that people decide to have a smaller number of children, significantly smaller than in the past, and that it is largely a conscious decision. As early as the 1960's, when the new trends were clearly taking hold, specialist circles believed that it was a matter of a temporary variation, that the birthrate would remain stable and that over the long term it would not threaten reproduction of the population. It was felt that the long-term decline in the birthrate would stop at a level resulting in simple replacement. Actually it was not only here, but throughout the developed world, that in the second half of the 1960's processes began that led to a further decline in the birthrate so that it fell far below the level needed to assure simple replacement of the population. About two centuries have been enough for the developed world as a whole, and especially in certain countries, the most obvious examples being northern Italy, the FRG, and Hungary among the socialist countries, to develop, in their extreme, forms of population replacement that in the not too distant future threaten real difficulties and changes, whose results are as yet difficult to foresee."

In the middle of the 1980's, the questions of too low a birthrate were encountered in northern Italian provinces. In Lombardy, the Piedmont, and elsewhere, the birthrate sank to half that required to assure simple replacement of the population. Statistically that means that a woman, who should on the average give birth to something more than two children, was bearing only one or slightly more. There are regions where it is markedly less.

"These are data that, in the first place, no one in the profession expected, and which, secondly, provoke justifiable concern," according to Dr Malacic. "A level half of that necessary for simple replacement, in the coming decades, will actually lead to a substantial reduction in the absolute number of the total population, and also to difficulties that would build fluctuations into the reproduction process that cannot be corrected by normal decisions: the number of women in their reproductive years would so decrease, the age structure would be so distorted, that only an exceptional increase in the birthrate in several coming decades would again lead to the level necessary for normal population replacement. It is not necessary to add that the long-range continuation of such a trend would simply lead to the extinction of the nation."

The Mathematical Exit From History

It is impossible to avoid the vexing question: in how long? "It is a matter of mathematics," explains Dr Janez Malacic, "even though mathematics is not always exactly what is hidden by the calculations." [sentence as published]

The mathematical model for calculating the period in which the population of a given territory would die out is noted by the specialists in the form of the exponential function $A \times e^{rt}$ (where A indicates the initial number of the population, x is a mathematical factor, t is time, and r is the rate of growth). With a 1 percent birthrate, the population doubles in 70 years, while at 2.5 percent, (the birthrate for the Albanian population in Kosovo), the population doubles in 28 years. If there is a negative birthrate (below the level that assures simple replacement), the result in years shows a number when a given people will no longer be, when it will only be historically in existence.

Such a negative result would—at least theoretically—be possible to calculate for the Slovenian example, since the birthrate in our republic has sunk below the level that would allow an unconcerned glance toward the coming centuries.

"The birthrate is between 80 and 90 percent of that necessary to assure simple replacement," says Dr Malacic, "and it has been that way since the end of the 1960's. The impact so far has not been as critical as in neighboring northern Italy, but it becomes critical with the constant trends toward a further decline. It is completely realistic to expect that the trend will not correct itself, and the only riddle, which the coming years will answer, is probably the speed with which the birthrate will continue to decline."

The hopelessness of the situation can perhaps best be illustrated by the position of an indecisive misfortunate, who finds himself on the ledge of the highest window of a tall building and who, not knowing himself how, has locked the window. Finally he cannot take any more, and in his heart does not want to, since he knows that sometime he will fall, and there is no one there to call to for help. Even though this is a matter of one man, an individual, with the low Slovenian birthrate it would also be applicable to the future and fate of some ethnic groups. It seems that such a people resembles a helpless and desperate person on the highest window ledge, for in the same way it does not know how or doesn't want (?) to open the closed window to return to security.

The question is whether a society can unconcernedly watch its own demise (at present everything seems aimed directly at that), or whether it will attempt to change the trend, to return to normal.

"By recognizing the weighty problems and beginning to resolve them, society will avoid having to deal with the

problems in some future period, when the solutions will require substantially more means, will be substantially different, and will ultimately have markedly less results than a timely solution, implemented right away, would have had," advises Dr Malacic.

How to resolve it is so far not clear to the profession as a whole, although a number of more or less successful models have been proffered by countries in which demographic issues have been faced earlier and more resolutely than here in Slovenia. Demographic experts still do not have a definitive answer to the riddle as to why the Slovenian birthrate fell from a record of nearly 36,000, and kept falling, until it reached the disturbing level of about 26,000 live births last year.

Few Encouraging Models

"The profession certainly knows quite a lot about those causes," explains Dr Malacic, "but we don't know everything, particularly since 20 years is a relatively short period, and also because for a long time a certain optimism prevailed and no one expected that the birthrate would fall that much. Another reason is that the profession has its weaknesses and in some places, including here, it is not as developed as it should be. The reliable fact is that the causes of the low birthrate should be tied to the modern way of life, to changes that have been brought by the transition from the traditional way of life to an industrial and even postindustrial society. New dimensions have changed the position of women in the family, the role of children in the family, and society has changed, a major decline in infant mortality and mortality in general together with a whole group of changes, about which an entire book could be written, have again contributed their results. The causes are economic, social, psychological, anthropological, and also include a number of less remarkable ones, all the way to biological and cultural reasons that are difficult to make into an understandable and easily acceptable truth for everyone."

It seems that a people that is indecisively and fatefully waiting on a window ledge should be offered defense mechanisms by those who hold the window key in their hands or who could easily bring some sort of fire ladder. What solutions could there be?

Again we should mention that essentially the same questions have been faced by many other societies (with 1-year work leaves for mothers, free health care for children, with voluntary contributions for the construction of pediatric institutions and many other benefits, which are also offered by Slovenia). Not one approach justified expectations or could be applied to another situation without qualification.

Dr Janez Malacic asserts: "The solutions are known, at least essentially, as are their consequences, which are not the most encouraging. Since the entire developed world

is encountering the problem of low or extremely low birthrates, individual countries have developed various practices for dealing with it. Various approaches have been accepted in various ways by the broadest public, as well as by politicians and the governments themselves, but not by the most concerned profession, which today nonetheless is extremely resolute, warning continually of the consequences, which in the near or distant future can result from too low a birthrate. Specialists are nearly unanimous in the demand that society must intervene. Even while allowing choice, contemporary society knows how to intervene and how effective its effort is likely to be. It is sad that currently developed countries do not offer completely encouraging demographic policies to follow. Even such an expressly pronatal policy as that in France, which has been in effect for 25 years, has not given completely satisfactory results: the birthrate did not in fact fall as low as in neighboring countries, yet nonetheless it stayed at a level of approximately 80 percent of that required to maintain a stable population."

France found itself faced with essentially the same extreme problem of a too-low birthrate, or even a more extreme situation than in Slovenia, although elimination of its causes was given a quarter of a century of time and a sum of money which is unreachable for us. We could easily be happy in our foresight and patient waiting for true solutions from some place else, if the problem of 50 million Frenchmen was not so acutely comparable to the problem of a nation, about which the Agropop sings, "There's just a million of us," and if the expected trend of continuing decline in the birthrate with a simultaneously further deepening of the economic crisis did not daily call for some action to begin.

Perhaps it is already too late for effective action. The partial demographic policies that some countries have attempted with similar large shortages of useful instruments for needed endeavors (including but not limited to finances) have given results of dubious clarity. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR have been able to improve the birthrate only over the short term and have offered new proof—which is needed everywhere—that the application, and above all the conduct, of a certain demographic policy leaves as many questions for specialists in the demographic sciences as for policy decisions.

Birthrate and the Crisis: How Close a Bond?

It is essential to know that demographic policies adapted to our needs and capabilities cannot be established in the short term," stresses Dr Malacic. "The first in a series of necessary steps must be made by a policy move: a decision must be made to establish a climate in which the problem would become known to the broadest public, and then, when the need is widely recognized, it is necessary to prepare measures that are supported financially and otherwise, under which the adopted demographic policy can truly be implemented."

It is certain that a further decline in the birthrate—which superficial data of the past decade show will almost certainly occur—will threaten the continued existence of the Slovenian people. "The average, statistical woman, who gives birth to just one child, poses a question of a completely different degree for a country of 50-60 million population than for ours," warns Dr Malacic. "I truly hope, that the society will recognize the problem in time. For now, unfortunately, I only know for certain that most of our specialists who are involved with the matter still encounter misunderstanding and have relatively little success in struggling with the task of getting all people who are responsible for the development of the society to understand the problem. The difficulty lies in the fact that politics is mostly involved in daily matters, while somehow there is never any time for long-term ones."

The gigantic changes that in the past fifty years have altered the appearance of the developed world, that have somehow remained unnoticed and in the shadows, now have begun to happen quickly before our very eyes, perhaps also because of the very scope of this task that has not been totally managed by any society. The nature, weightiness, and complexity of the manifestations that we simply label a declining birthrate have been noted only by individual warning voices, who always say that the problems that have taken so long to develop will also require long-term solutions.

"Today the dimensions are not yet critical, but they can very quickly become so, and thus we should seek solutions as soon as possible. Just the process of informing the public," states Dr Malacic, "can readily create a public climate which will not only facilitate the problem's solution but will demand it. Our circumstances are different, for people support a feeling of absolute freedom and individuality in this area that society refuses to interfere with, even through the best democratic means. That does not seem acceptable to me. Every individual is not only dependent on society, but is also obliged in many various ways to contribute to society, in good times and poor."

The consequences of disturbances in human reproduction pose a massive question, as is much better known in those countries that are already facing them. Among the most sensitive consequences is the threat of the collapse of the entire social security system for the retired. Under somewhat weaker governmental circumstances, it is not even difficult to imagine a moment in the future when circumstances in combination with unfavorable demographic trends would make it impossible for a society to pay normal pensions. Even today, when the retired population forms a relatively small part of the whole, funding for paying pensions is a constant problem. There is room for optimism (and it offers little solace) only perhaps in the expectation that the future society of high technology with production automation will successfully avoid similar catastrophes. It is more realistic to expect that our state will confront real difficulties and that the anticipated demographic trends will be yet further exacerbated.

A connection between the low birthrate and the government crisis in Slovenian circumstances clearly exists. It is almost impossible, however, to determine the degree to which the crisis actually influences the birthrate. "Perhaps less than we might expect," suggests Dr Malacic, "since the birthrate is also declining in countries that are living better than ever, such as the FRG or Italy. Here the crisis almost completely conceals the fact that people apparently put off children or deliberately plan fewer children than they would have otherwise. Especially members of the younger generation, which cannot in a normal manner either find employment or get housing and provide for the most essential vital needs, are forced to consider whether they should have children or not, and if so, how many."

The New Reproductive Conscience

The continuing crisis severely threatens in the future to create a generation gap that an aging population will not be able to fill.

"The examples of northern Italy or the FRG warn equally that it is far more than an economic issue. In the profession," states Dr Malacic, "we strongly stress the so-called reproductive conscience. For a traditional society the reproductive conscience was significant in that it in various ways forced individuals to have more children. Modern society simply must develop a conscience that will accommodate changes. The society's standard should become a family with two or three children, for only such a family size would assure an unhampered maintenance of the population. Available resources should be redistributed to the benefit of such families. In all ways we must prevent the acceptance of a social standard with one child or even childless—that is too few and over the long term leads to disaster."

We only have to recall the reform attempts of the last few months to see that there is little room left for such social recommendations, for there simply are none of the necessary material means to support them. It is only realistic to count on those things that can really be expected.

Unfortunately, examples where long-term social crises have a positive impact on increasing the birthrate are rarer than white crows. France is one of the rare countries in which a long-term crisis, such as World War II, increased the birthrate. It has been shown numerous times that nationalism can increase the birthrate, but of course that is not an instrument that can be recommended in place of the normal ways of encouraging a higher birthrate.

There remains reliance on the individual, and it all boils down to the fact that "the decision on birth is one of the most decentralized decisions in society," as Dr Janez Malacic explains, "and the consolation that must be accepted in the absence of better ones, is that the Slovenes of the future should not be sought in numbers

but in quality. That is also, in the absence of any attainable, better solutions, some sort of a half-joyful stand on Slovenian policy, when conversation turns to the sensitive and (overly) demanding question of the decline in the Slovenian birthrate. As far as a formula which would allow us to figure with some precision how much time is available for indifference toward the question of the birthrate and the mathematical existence of the Slovene people and would justify the prevalence of such deliberations, it is fearful for all to consider...

[Box, pp 8-9]

[Remarks by Prof Joze Lokar, Center for Mental Health in Ljubljana, Moste-Polje University Psychiatric Clinic]

There Are No Reliable Ways of Improving the Birthrate

The decision of parents as to how many children they will have depends on numerous variables, that encompass largely personal matters, and of course, social circumstances. Any simplification is not only ineffective, but even worse unreliable. That applies to prevention of too high a number of children as well as to encouraging increase of too low a birthrate. Those who assert that they know the fundamental causes of too high or too low a birthrate as well as dependable means for adjusting either cannot be taken seriously.

The decision of individuals on the number of children they will have comes from viewpoints that are only slightly dependent on momentary social circumstances; rather, they are of a more "emotional nature," and from rational convictions that respect real living possibilities, as well as momentary and anticipated socioeconomic events.

A decision on the number of children is usually dependent on both father and mother. The significance and weight of the future father's decision in comparison with that of the future mother vary in individual sociocultural environments, and also vary within the same environment (although less notably). In general, however, it can be said that in more "patriarchally" structured societies the voice of the father has more weight than in societies where both sexes are more equal. Thus in Slovenia, for example, there will not be more children if Slovene women do not feel greater encouragement for more children, while in Kosovo there will not be fewer children if their husbands are not in agreement with it.

The Unpredictable Influence of Living Standard

The standard of living doubtless influences the number of children, yet that influence is incredibly unpredictable. Thus both things are possible: a low standard of living encourages or suppresses the birthrate, or even may be less important than numerous other influences.

Birth and Suicide

Among circumstances that depend on social events, doubtless satisfaction with the present and optimism for the future have an encouraging impact on the number of children. If these attitudes are lacking, people not only do not live happily (as is sometimes shown as an increase in the number of suicides), but they also do not happily give birth to new life.

Apparently the simple data that few children are born in those European countries (but also in those parts of Yugoslavia) where the suicide rate is highest warns of the fact that conception and perhaps suicide are certainly dependent on individual decision, but are also subject to unfavorable social influence.

Why Measures Have Not Been Effective

The decline in the birthrate in Slovenia has been a lasting and well-known phenomenon for a long time, so what is happening now should not be any sort of surprise. Decades ago it was known what would happen. The events of the latest years, which have pushed people into poverty, which causes fundamental anxiety and paints the future black, have contributed to but not caused the process (of a low birthrate). A similar decline in the number of births, such as has been taking place in Slovenia for some time, is causing concern (or has been) in many European countries.

Considering what we know about human nature, I must warn that the consequences of the crisis will continue to be felt long after the crisis itself is resolved. Thus the fear is quite justified that the impact of the present crisis of a declining birthrate will only truly be felt in the future, if there are no effective social processes to correct it.

Although it is now modern to indulge in exaggerated criticism, I will not follow that mode. Yet I cannot ignore the fact that Slovenian policy has by its deeds attempted to halt the decline in the birthrate by measures such as lengthening maternity leaves, more just wages during maternity leave, the polycentric development of Slovenia, good and of course free health care for children, and some other measures. Unfortunately there have also been opposing phenomena, such as the burgeoning employment of women, unfavorable housing measures, and others.

The measures have not been effective, and yet no one really expected that they would be. Specifically, too much reliance was placed on the hope that if material benefits were better, the birthrate would be better. Yet in deciding on the number of children, not only reason but feelings are involved, which do not depend on money or the material standard of the moment.

'Vitality' and the Birthrate

The notion that a people has "vitality" if it has a high birthrate is mistaken but very persistent. Besides that, in recent history we hardly know of an example where a people was threatened by too few children, or indeed because of biological events in general. Nations of today are more threatened because of cultural genocide than by biological destruction. Of course it is true that we are also concerned for "biological balance," yet I see much greater uncertainty in the loss of a people's sociocultural identity. Although I highly respect so-called "uniqueness of the individual," nevertheless I do not believe that it is possible without firm national roots. Current events, which after decades of explanations about the "international working class" show throughout the socialist countries absolute contradictions of those explanations, represent the crudest nationalism, and are a challenge to sociologists, not psychiatrists. Of course, my thinking is much simpler: with every animal or plant species that becomes extinct, we lose unique information forever. With every nation that is lost to cultural genocide, the sociocultural heritage of humanity as a whole forever loses a unique linguistic and cultural element.

Emptiness and Immigration

A lower birthrate and with that an equal or even lesser number of people in some ethnic group naturally spawns special economic strictures (because of different dimensions of the "productive" and "nonproductive" population, although that should not be oversimplified). Completely different strictures emerge if the "emptiness" is filled by the immigration of people of other ethnicity, which has been occurring all over Europe for decades already, not only here. The latest tensions, which are basically international, and which also always appear as internal, cannot truly be resolved anywhere, and thus it is not surprising that the same holds true here. The fluctuations between patience and impatience are not just our peculiarity, they are occurring all over Europe.

Are there anywhere such unwise acts being undertaken as here among us, where we have invested huge sums of money in industry that requires not only raw materials and energy, but also human resources from elsewhere, so that we have to hire them, only to see them fall into difficulties themselves. Since psychiatry in principle deals with madness and not stupidity, I don't feel called to discuss these matters.

In particular, outside my calling, I am convinced that a patient coexistence of two or more cultures enriches each of them, as long as no one tries to forge separate cultures into a new nonculture. Thus it is not most important how we are made to live together, but rather how we live together with each other.

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